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Abstract
Policies that change economic and social outcomes for citizens may not always lead
to support for the political party that introduced the policy. In 2008, under the Youth
Opportunities Program, the Ugandan government encouraged groups of young people
to submit proposals to start enterprises. Among the 535 groups whose proposals were
deemed eligible, a random 265 received grants of nearly $400 per person. A companion
paper showed that, after four years, YOP raised employment by 17% and earnings by
38%. Here, we show that YOP recipients were no more likely to support the ruling party
in elections. Rather, recipients slightly increased party membership, campaigning, and
voting in favor of the opposition parties. We discuss potential mechanisms for this
effect, including misattribution of YOP, group socialization, and financial independence
freeing voters from transactional voting.
Keywords. Political behavior, voting, partisanship, employment, labor market
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1 Introduction
What are the political impacts of development programs? Governments that deliver pro-
grams to their constituents hope to be rewarded at the polls. They hope for rewards even
when those policies are targeted programmatically — based on need or merit — rather than
in a clientelistic way. There are good reasons to think voters reward governments for good
policy. In developed democracies, there is evidence that voters punish or reward incumbents
for effective policies, for economic conditions, and even for events beyond the government’s
control.1 Forward-looking voters may also be swayed by effective government programs.
For instance, they could view programmatic policies as a signal that the regime is either
competent or taking a policy stance that matches voters’ preferences.
There is now a good deal of evidence that voters reward governments for programmatic
policies in middle-income democracies, especially from social safety net programs in Latin
America. Golden and Min (2013) note that most studies have found that as transfers to a
district rise, voter turnout and incumbent vote share tend to rise as well.2 Nonetheless, it is
probably too early to draw firm conclusions. Golden and Min not only suggest exceptions
to this pattern, but also raise concerns of publication bias against null findings.3 Indeed, as
this paper will show, transfer programs have sometimes unexpected political consequences.
We know little about the effects of programmatic policies on politics in low-income coun-
1A large literature argues that voters reward incumbents for economic conditions because they themselves
are doing better or stand to gain (e.g. Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). Voters also punish politicians for irrelevant
events, suggesting voters may follow a form of blind retrospection (e.g. Healy et al., 2010) .
2In Uruguay, Manacorda et al. (2011) find that households that benefited from a conditional cash transfer
(CCT) are 11–13 percentage points more likely to support the current government than the previous one.
In Colombia, Baez et al. (2012) show that recipients of health and education transfers in Colombia were
more likely to register, vote and support the government. In Romania, Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches (2012)
use a discontinuity in a cash transfer program to the poor to show that receipt buys turnout and support
for the incumbent. In Mexico, De La O (2013) finds that villages randomized into a CCT have 7% higher
turnout and 9% higher incumbent vote share (though Imai et al. (2016) have pointed out that this is driven
by increases in registration not turnout, and Schober (2016) argues that the effect is limited to turnout and
not incumbent vote share). These populations are wealthier than the target population in Uganda. It is
difficult to compare earnings, but we estimate the target population in Uganda earns no more than 40% as
much as the target populations in Latin America.
3Imai et al. (2016) evaluate a large-scale health policy experiment in Mexico supported by all political
parties and find that (perhaps because of this broad support across parties) little effect of the program on
vote turnout or shares for the incumbent regime.
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tries. Most evidence comes from high and middle-income countries and from more overtly
clientelistic programs, where the benefits can easily be withdrawn or tied to political sup-
port. Patronage and pork are common and so deservedly get a lot of attention. But parties
also compete programmatically, and it is important to understand their political rewards.
Another reason to be interested in the poorest countries is that many of their social pro-
grams are funded by foreign aid. The program we study here was financed by the government,
but with a concessionary loan and expertise from the World Bank. If poor voters reward
incumbents for foreign-funded development programs, then aid could insulate incumbents
from competition and accountability to citizens, possibly assisting them to become more
authoritarian or extractive (Moss et al., 2006).
The Youth Opportunities Program (YOP) in Uganda offers a chance to investigate this.
In 2006–07 Uganda’s central government, with assistance from The World Bank, developed
the program to help poor and unemployed young adults become self-employed artisans, such
as carpenters or tailors. YOP targeted the under-developed northern districts, and invited
young people in these districts to form small groups and submit proposals on how they
would use a cash grant to start independent trades. Thousands of groups applied. Local
bureaucrats nominated proposals for funding. In 2008, they identified 535 eligible groups
and awarded grants to 265 of them via lottery. Successful groups received grants of about
$382 per person to pay for training and start-up costs. This was roughly the annual income
of the average applicant.
YOP, like most government programs, was partisan in the sense that it was designed and
supported by the ruling party, and the party hoped to reap electoral support for developing
the country. But YOP was still programmatic in the sense that its targeting, advertising,
and implementation ignored partisan affiliations. Indeed, we find that most people said YOP
was aimed at developing the north rather than at increasing political support.
YOP raised incomes. We experimentally evaluated the economic impacts in 2010 and
2012 in a companion paper (Blattman et al., 2014) and found that people invested grants in
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training and capital and, four years later, had 38% higher earnings. As a result, YOP is one
of the few examples of an employment program with cost-effective impacts (Blattman and
Ralston, 2015).
In this paper, we compare successful and unsuccessful applicants to understand the po-
litical impacts of YOP. Four years after disbursement of the grant, we collected self-reported
data on political preferences, voting behaviors, and other political actions. Did these poor
and largely poorly educated recipients reward incumbents at the polls for good policy and
programs? If so, this could be a powerful incentive for political parties to compete based on
programmatic appeals instead of patronage.
We find an unexpected result: three years after YOP disbursement, beneficiaries were
no more likely to vote for the ruling party than the control group, and they were actually
more likely to work to get opposition parties elected. This suggests that policies that change
economic and social outcomes for citizens may not always lead to support for the party that
introduced the policy, at least among young poor voters such as these.
If anything, there was a decrease in support for the ruling party and President. Eighty-
eight percent of the control group reported that they voted to reelect the President in 2011,
but those who received YOP were 4 percentage points less likely to do so. Given the small
opposition vote share (12%), this increased opposition vote share by a quarter. Moreover,
those who received YOP were also almost twice as likely to say that they had joined the
opposition or actively worked to get opposition parties elected. While small in absolute
terms, this is a large relative change: an increase of 3 percentage points on a base of about
4 percentage points. The effects were even larger in more local elections: in electing district
counselors, YOP applicants assigned to the program were about 20 percentage points less
likely to vote for an incumbent ruling candidate than an opposition one.
So what then explains the null effect on ruling party support and the increase in political
activities in favor of the opposition? We walk through possible mechanisms and the evidence
for or against them.
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First, our sample could attribute the program to foreign funders and either fail to reward
(or punish) the incumbent government.4 Or, they could see that they were in fact selected
by the government, but randomly did not receive the program, and so have no reason to
reward the incumbent.5 As it happens, a majority of both the treatment and control groups
gave the incumbent government credit for implementing YOP. Few remembered that groups
had been selected randomly. But YOP recipients who did not attribute the program to the
government were more likely to support the opposition. While this result is not statistically
significant, misattribution could account for some of the effects we observe.
Second, incomes may have brought financial independence, freeing voters from clientelis-
tic networks and allowing them to act on their political preferences. Program evaluations in
South Africa, Brazil, Mexico and the Philippines have argued that rising incomes or uncon-
ditional transfers weaken a regime’s ability to foster clients and buy participation (Magaloni,
2006; Larreguy et al., 2015; De Kadt and Lieberman, 2015; Hite-Rubin, 2015; Bobonis et al.,
2017). Vote buying is common in Uganda. These are mainly small cash gifts in the run-
up to the election, both openly at rallies and secretly on the eve of the election. Mostly
the ruling party buys votes, as the opposition rarely has enough funds. We do not have
direct measures of vote buying. But we see some evidence consistent with the hypothesis
that moderate income gains from YOP can free opposition supporters to campaign openly
for their preferred candidate. For instance, party preferences do not change with YOP or
incomes; YOP only affects voting and public actions in support of a candidate. Moreover,
support for the opposition is correlated with higher earnings in our sample.6 And finally,
YOP recipients were less likely to be mobilized to turn out by political party operatives.
Income is just one possible mechanism. There are others that we are not able to test.
4Using survey experiments in India, Dietrich and Winters (2014) find suggestive evidence that politicians
lose reputation when programs are revealed as foreign-funded.
5In Bangladesh, Guiteras and Mobarak (2016) find that politicians opportunistically try to associate
themselves with foreign-funded projects by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). When the politician’s
role in program assignment wasn’t clear, citizens gave the political partial credit. When the assignment rules
and attribution of the projects were clear, however, citizens did not reward the politician at all.
6We must take this view with caution, however, as income grew across the board in the sample, and we
are not able to directly observe a generalized increase in opposition support.
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Groups may have exposed youth to new political ideas or collective action. Or YOP may
have increased beneficiaries’ exposure to local politicians. The association between income
and public opposition support is important and unexpected, however. We believe this calls
for more research on the downstream political effects of government and aid programs.
2 Context, intervention, and experiment
Uganda, a small country in east Africa, is extremely poor but with a stable and growing
economy.7 Since 2006, two major parties and a number of smaller ones have competed in
national elections every five years. Nonetheless, the National Resistance Movement (NRM)
party and its leader, President Yoweri Museveni, have been in power for 30 years.
While there is a high degree of party competition at the local level, the ruling party
suppresses political opposition for the Presidency, and cements its position through various
forms of patronage. For this reason, most analysts consider Uganda a “hegemonic party
system” or “multiparty autocracy” (e.g. Tripp, 2010). Even though the ruling party has
a built in advantage, elections are still a fairly competitive affair. Participation rates are
high, and election day itself is perceived as free and fair by Ugandans and the international
community. The ruling party’s advantage comes not from its interference in the actual
vote, or extensive fraud, but rather the use of public funds during the campaign, extensive
patronage, and the intimidation of opposition candidates.8
Both the ruling and opposition parties run extensive rallies, party mobilization effects,
7Shortly before the program, in 2007, it had a population of about 30 million and GDP per capita of
roughly $330. Real gross domestic product grew 6.5% per year from 1990 to 2007, inflation was under 5%,
and poverty rates were falling (Government of Uganda, 2007). This growth puts Uganda’s GDP per capita
slightly above the sub-Saharan average.
8See Mwenda and Tangri (2005). For instance, vote buying is extensive in the weeks leading up to the
election, peaking the evening before. This vote buying is much more common among the ruling party,
possibly because of the diversion of public funds and other corruption (Blattman et al., 2016). The forms
of patronage are varied and many, but a recent and visible example is the rapid increase in the creation
of administrative districts, which allows the national government to expand public employment and central
government transfers and use these for political gain . Finally, an example of intimidation were the repeated
attempts of the ruling party and military to imprison and try the main opposition candidate for President,
sharply curtailing his ability to campaign.
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and vote-buying campaigns around the country. The biggest difference is that the ruling
party has more resources. Nonetheless, competition is fairly intense for parliamentary seats
and powerful district positions. Also, even if the President is unlikely to lose the election,
the ruling party has to respond aggressively to opposition support with campaigning, policy
change, pork projects, and vote buying. Opposition vote share sends a powerful message.
One of the government’s recent priorities has been to develop the north of the country
(Government of Uganda, 2007). The north is more distant from trade routes and, as an area
of early opposition support, received less public investment from the 1980s onward, especially
for power and roads. The north was also held back by insecurity. From 1987 to 2006 a
low-level insurgency destabilized north-central Uganda, and wars in Sudan and Democratic
Republic of Congo, fostered mild insecurity in the northwest. Cattle rustling and armed
banditry were commonplace in the northeast. As a result, in 2006 the government estimated
that nearly two-thirds of northern people were unable to meet basic needs, just over half were
literate, and most were (under)employed in subsistence agriculture (Government of Uganda,
2007). In 2003, peace came to Uganda’s neighbors and Uganda’s government increased
efforts to pacify and develop the north. By 2006, the military pushed the rebels out of the
country and began to disarm cattle-raiders. The government also began to improve northern
infrastructure. South Sudan also began to grow rapidly. With this political uncertainty
resolved, by 2008 the northern economy began to catch up.
Northern development serves at least two government objectives. One is economic, as
the government tries to maximize growth and minimize poverty. The other is political.
As multiparty elections become more and more competitive, and as NRM support in the
capital has waned, the ruling party appears to be interested in building a broader base of
political support in areas such as the north. While pork and patronage around elections is
commonplace, the national government has also pursued a set of broad-based and relatively
non-politicized programs that serve its broader development objectives.
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2.1 The Youth Opportunities Program
From 2003–10, the government’s northern development and security strategy centered around
the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund, or NUSAF. NUSAF was Uganda’s second-largest
development program, after the national agricultural extension program. Communities and
groups could apply under various NUSAF cash grants components for either community
infrastructure construction or livestock for the “ultra-poor”.
The government wanted to do more to boost non-agricultural employment. To do so, in
2006 it announced a third NUSAF component: the Youth Opportunities Program, or YOP.
YOP invited groups of young adults aged 16 to 35 to apply for grants to start a skilled
trade such as carpentry or tailoring. The theory underlying the program was that young
unemployed people had high returns to investments in vocational skills and equipment, but
had no starting capital and were credit constrained.
YOP had five key elements:
1. People had to apply as a group. One reason was administrative convenience: it was
easier to verify and disburse to a few hundred groups rather than thousands of people.
Another reason is that, in the absence of formal monitoring, officials hoped groups
would be more likely to implement proposals. The YOP groups in our sample ranged
from 10 to 40 people, averaging 22. They are mostly from the same village and typically
represent less than 1% of the local population.9 In our sample, most groups are mixed
(about one-third female on average), 5% of groups are all female and 12% all male.
2. Groups had to submit a written proposal. The proposal described how they would use
the grant for non-agricultural skills training and enterprise start-up costs. They could
request up to $10,000.10 Groups selected their own trainers, typically a local artisan or
9Half the groups existed already, often for several years, as farm cooperatives, or sports, drama, or
micro-finance clubs. New groups formed specifically for YOP were often initiated by a respected community
member (e.g. teachers, local leaders, or existing tradespersons) and sought members through social networks.
10The proposal specified member names, a management committee of five, the proposed trade(s), and the
assets to purchase. Decisions were made by member vote, and nearly all members report they had a voice.
Most groups proposed a single trade for all. One third proposed that different members would train two
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small institute. These are commonplace in Uganda and there is a tradition of artisans
taking on paid students as apprentices.
3. Groups had to receive formal advising. Many applicants were functionally illiterate,
so YOP also required “facilitators” (usually a local government employee, teacher, or
community leader) to meet with the group several times, advise them on program
rules, and help prepare the written proposals. Groups chose their own facilitators, and
the NUSAF office paid facilitators 2% of funded proposals (up to $200).
4. YOP applicants were screened at several levels of government. Villages typically sub-
mitted one application, and that privilege may have gone to the groups with the most
initiative, need, or connections. Village officials passed applications up to district-level
bureaucrats, who verified the minimum technical criteria (such as group size and a
complete proposal) and were supposed to visit projects they planned to fund. Districts
said they prioritized early applications and disqualified incomplete ones, and while this
is in line with our observations, unobserved quality and political calculations could have
played a role. A central government NUSAF office—an executive bureaucratic agency
created specifically for the implementation of the program—had final responsibility
for validating and approving the list of district projects and disbursing funds. Local
elected politicians generally had little active role in the project.
5. Successful groups received a large lump sum cash transfer to a bank account in the
names of the management committee, with no government monitoring thereafter. In
our sample, the average grant was UGX 12.9 million Ugandan shillings (UGX) per
group, or $7,497 in 2008 market exchange rates. Per capita grant size varied across
groups due to variation in group size and amounts requested, but 80% of grants were
between $200 and $600 per capita, and they averaged $382 per person (or $955 in PPP
to three different trades. Females and mixed groups often chose trades common to both genders, such as
tailoring or hairstyling. Males and a small number of females often chose building trades.
8
terms). Unless otherwise noted, all UGX amounts reported in this paper are 2008
UGX, and all USD are converted at market exchange rates.11
2.2 Was NUSAF a patronage program?
Government patronage is commonplace in Uganda (Green, 2011). New district creation
and public employment are prime examples of how the Ugandan government has sought to
build rural support. Nonetheless, our assessment is that the central government did not use
NUSAF, including the YOP component, for patronage purposes with individual voters.
The World Bank was closely involved in the design of the program, and monitored impro-
priety. This limited the program’s ability to reward supporters. Also, unelected local bureau-
crats nominated projects for funding. These bureaucrats undoubtedly received pressure from
politicians of all stripes, but (as we will see in Section 4.1) the program did not have a rep-
utation of being manipulated for electoral gain. Ugandan activists and press made frequent
(and subsequently proven) allegations of corruption and impropriety in NUSAF, especially
at the district level. But accusations of mass patronage or vote-buying were uncommon.12
Corruption in NUSAF (including “ghost projects” and irregular procurement contracts) may
have transferred funds from the government to local party machines, or strengthened other
patron-client relations. But we are not aware of systematic targeting of villages or people
for the grants.
We also see no evidence that YOP targeted supportive villages, party members, or swing
voters. For example, there is no significant correlation between percent of vote going to the
incumbent party in the 2004 election and the per capita NUSAF funds received between 2004
and 2007 at the subcounty level (see Appendix A.1). Indeed, the nomination process sought
to avoid this kind of patronage by design. Targeting was highly decentralized, with groups
11We use a 2008 market exchange rate of 1,720 UGX per USD and a PPP rate of 688 UGX per USD.
12Allegations of misuse concentrated on decisions prior to project nomination and selection, such as the
invention of “ghost projects” which transferred money directly to politicians or other insiders, or and the
awarding of construction contracts for the NUSAF components that involved local building projects.
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nominated by local leaders who may or may not be affiliated with the NRM.13 We observed
the selection, deliberation, and auditing process firsthand and the choosing of groups seemed
to be a mix of first-come-first-serve, meritocratic, and ad hoc priorities and procedures.
Rather, our discussions with government and World Bank officials suggest that the na-
tional government viewed NUSAF as a way to build support for the ruling party through
programmatic effectiveness. This is consistent with scholars who argue that the return of
multi-party politics to Uganda in 2005, coupled with the President controversially securing
the right to run for a third term, increased the ruling party’s incentives to use development
policy to mobilize electoral support (Hickey, 2013).
In terms of taking credit, the government did not make explicit efforts to market this as
coming from the NRM or central government. In fact, most marketing of the program was
done at the district level. District level officials were the ones that spent most of their time
going from community to community to advertise and take photos with funded projects.
Nonetheless, it is common knowledge that public finance is highly centralized in Uganda,
and all revenues and major expenditures come from the national government. Simply put,
the Office of the President is responsible for virtually every major development program in
the country.
2.3 Experimental design
YOP was oversubscribed, and we worked with the national NUSAF office to randomize
funding among screened and eligible proposals. Thousands of groups submitted proposals
in 2006. The NUSAF office funded hundreds in 2006-07, prior to our study. By 2008, 14
NUSAF-eligible districts had funds remaining. Figure 1 maps these study districts.14
The study population was only moderately affected by war and political instability. None
13Participatory nomination processes that involved the whole village were commonplace. Facilitators
helped groups organize and write their proposals, particularly teachers and local bureaucrats, and to our
knowledge facilitators were not typically political operators or organizers at election time.
14By 2008, a national program of decentralization had subdivided these 14 districts into 22, as depicted
in the map, but YOP was organized, disbursed, and randomized using the original 14 districts from 2003.
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of the most war-affected districts (Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader) had the funds to participate
in the final round. Thus the districts in our study were either on the margins of the conflict
(center north), more vulnerable to banditry and cattle raiding than conflict (northeast) or
relatively secure but underdeveloped (northwest). There are almost no ex-combatants in the
study groups. Little distinguishes our sample from other poor Ugandan youth.
District governments nominated 2.5 times the number of groups they could fund. The
districts submitted roughly 625 proposals to the national NUSAF office, who reviewed them
for completeness and validity. To minimize chances of corruption, the central NUSAF of-
fice also sent out audit teams to visit and verify each group. They disqualified about 70
applications, mainly for incomplete information or ineligibility.15
In January 2008 the NUSAF office provided the research team with a list of 535 remaining
groups eligible for randomization, along with district budgets. We randomly assigned 265
of the 535 groups (5,460 individuals) to treatment and 270 groups (5,828 individuals) to
control, stratified by district. Control groups were not waitlisted to receive YOP in future.
During the baseline survey, before treatment status was known, groups were told they had
a 50% chance of funding and that there were no plans to extend the YOP program in the
future. Spillovers between study villages are unlikely as the 535 groups were spread across
454 communities in a population of more than five million, and control groups are typically
very distant from treatment villages. Figure 1 also maps eligible groups per parish.
2.4 Data and participants
We selected five people from each of the 535 groups to be tracked and interviewed three times
over four years—a potential panel of 2,677 people (seven were inadvertently surveyed in one
group at baseline). We worked with Uganda’s Bureau of Statistics to conduct a baseline
survey in February and March 2008, prior to the announcement and funding of treatment
groups. This was a survey of demographic and economic information only, as the government
15E.g. many group members over 35 years, or a group size more than 40. The government also asked that
22 groups of underserved people (Muslims and orphans) be funded automatically.
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Table 1: Selected baseline descriptive statistics and tests of balance
Baseline (n=2598) Found in 2010 (n=2005) Found in 2012 (n=1868)
Treatment – Treatment – Treatment –
Control Control Control Control Control Control
Select covariates in 2008 Mean Diff. p-value Mean Diff. p-value Mean Diff. p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Applicant group size 22.53 0.03 0.96
Grant requested, per group member, USD 363.05 14.09 0.25
Group existed before application 0.45 0.03 0.42 0.44 0.04 0.36 0.45 0.04 0.36
Individual unfound at baseline 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.47 0.30 -0.01 0.75
Age 24.75 0.17 0.55 24.94 0.20 0.48 25.06 0.06 0.84
Female 0.35 -0.02 0.38 0.36 -0.04 0.15 0.36 -0.05 0.10
Large town or urban area 0.23 -0.02 0.61 0.21 -0.02 0.65 0.18 0.01 0.84
Weekly employment, hours 10.70 0.57 0.48 10.92 0.03 0.97 10.64 1.05 0.24
All non-agricultural work 5.99 -0.45 0.44 6.09 -0.73 0.25 5.82 -0.45 0.49
All agricultural work 4.66 1.04 0.04 4.78 0.81 0.14 4.75 1.54 0.01
Engaged in a skilled trade 0.08 0.00 0.81 0.08 0.01 0.61 0.07 0.01 0.66
Highest grade reached at school 7.95 -0.07 0.62 7.99 -0.06 0.71 7.88 -0.09 0.60
Able to read and write minimally 0.75 -0.03 0.17 0.75 -0.03 0.14 0.74 -0.03 0.19
Received prior vocational training 0.07 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.14
Wealth index -0.16 0.07 0.12 -0.16 0.06 0.27 -0.17 0.05 0.40
Monthly gross cash earnings (000s 2008 UGX) 62.19 6.89 0.30 62.11 10.24 0.17 63.96 6.62 0.41
Savings in past 6 mo. (00s 2008 UGX) 19.25 10.89 0.02 19.88 7.11 0.16 16.75 9.68 0.04
Can obtain 100,000 UGX loan 0.33 0.05 0.01 0.36 0.03 0.17 0.34 0.04 0.10
Registered to vote in 2006 0.92 -0.01 0.57 0.93 -0.01 0.61 0.93 -0.01 0.42
Voted in 2006 presidential election 0.73 0.03 0.21 0.73 0.04 0.08 0.75 0.00 0.91
Member of a political party 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.36 0.12 0.02 0.13
Currently on a community committee 0.17 0.01 0.60 0.18 0.01 0.77 0.18 0.02 0.36
Parish vote share for Museveni, 2006 0.32 0.00 0.99 0.32 0.00 0.82 0.31 0.00 0.95
Ever member of armed group 0.03 0.00 0.88 0.03 0.00 0.87 0.03 0.00 0.62
p-value from joint F-test 0.00 0.10 0.02
Notes: Columns (1), (4), and (7) report the mean of control group members. Columns (2), (5), and (8) report the mean difference between the treatment and control groups,
calculated using an OLS regression of baseline characteristics on an indicator for random program assignment plus district fixed effects while columns (3), (6), and (9) report
p-values. Standard errors robust and clustered at the group level. All USD and Ugandan shilling (UGX)-denominated variables and all hours worked variables were top-censored
at the 99th percentile to contain outliers. Baseline refers to all respondents surveyed at baseline, while 2010 and 2012 refer to the respondents located in each year, respectively.
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Figure 1: Eligible districts and study communities (treatment and control) per parish
Districts with Study Groups
1 Group in Parish
2 Groups in Parish
3 or more Groups in Parish
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of communities participating per parish using 2007 district boundaries. The majority
of parishes had either one or two groups apply.
did not want to be seen collecting overtly political data in advance of YOP. Enumerators
and local officials mobilized group members to complete a survey of demographic data on
all members as well as group characteristics. Virtually all members were mobilized, and we
randomly selected five of the members present to be individually surveyed and tracked.
Enumerators could not locate 13 groups (3% of the sample). Unusually, after the survey
it was discovered that all 13 were assigned to the control group. We investigated the matter
and found no motive for or evidence of foul play. District officials, enumerators, and the
groups themselves did not know the treatment status of the groups they were mobilizing.
We were only able to find one of the 13 at endline.
Funds were disbursed between July and September 2008. Working with private, inde-
13
pendent survey organizations, we conducted the first 2-year endline survey between August
2010 and March 2011, 24 to 30 months after disbursement. We conducted a 4-year survey
between April and June 2012, 44 to 47 months after disbursement, and just over a year
after the 2011 national elections. The World Bank and Government of Uganda paid for
the baseline and 2-year surveys. Both insisted that we ask no political questions. Thus we
conducted the 4-year survey with private funds and were able to include political questions,
drawing on the Uganda Afrobarometer and similar polls to maximize comparability.
Participants Table 1 reports baseline descriptive statistics for a selection of baseline vari-
ables, and we report the full set of 57 variables reported in Appendix B.1. We see that
members of the 535 eligible groups were generally young, rural, poor, credit constrained,
and underemployed. In 2008 they were 25 years on average, mainly aged 16 to 35. In 2011,
16.1% would have been eligible to vote for the first time, and 34.1% would have been eligible
to vote just for the second time. Less than a quarter lived in a town, and most lived in vil-
lages of 100 to 2000 households. A quarter did not finish primary school, but on average they
reached eighth grade. Given that the three most war-affected districts did not participate in
the YOP evaluation, only 3% were involved in an armed group in any fashion.
In 2008 the sample reported 11 hours of work a week. Half these hours were low-skill
labor or petty business, while the other half was in agriculture—rudimentary subsistence
and cash cropping on small rain-fed plots with little equipment or inputs. Almost half of our
sample reported no employment in the past month, and only 8% were engaged in a skilled
trade. Cash earnings in the past month averaged a dollar a day. Savings in the past six
months were $15 on average, and only 11% reported any savings.16
Tracking and attrition YOP applicants were a young, mobile population. Nearly 40%
had moved or were away temporarily at each endline. To minimize attrition we used a two-
1633% held loans, but these were small: under $7 at the median among those who have any loans, mainly
from friends and family. About 10% reported they could obtain a large loan of 1,000,000 UGX (about $580).
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phase tracking approach, outlined in Appendix A.2. In a first phase, we tracked all 2,677
members of the sample, and in a second phase we did intensive tracking of a random sample
of unfound. Our response rate was 97% at baseline. Effective response rates (weighted for
selection into tracking) were 85% after 2 years and 82% after 4.
Of slightly greater concern is correlation between attrition and treatment, reported in
Appendix B.2. The treatment group was 5 percentage points more likely to be found at
baseline in 2008, because of the 13 unfound groups (who did not know their treatment
status). In 2012, controls were 7 percentage points less likely to be found. Most of these
unfound controls were from the 13 “never found” groups.
If unfound controls are particularly successful, we could overstate the impact of the in-
tervention. Such bias is conceivable: baseline covariates are significantly correlated with
attrition and the unfound tend to be younger, poorer, less literate farmers from larger com-
munities (see Appendix B.2). For this reason our treatment effects estimates will control for
baseline characteristics associated with attrition, and we will test the sensitivity of results
to various attrition scenarios.
2.5 Empirical strategy
In designing the experiment, our primary outcomes of interest were the direct economic ef-
fects of the business planning and cash on economic performance: investments in training
and business assets, levels and type of employment, and incomes.17 The longer-term polit-
ical impacts were of interest from the beginning, but we did not identify them as primary
outcomes, in part because any political effects were likely to be indirect and a function of suc-
cessful economic impacts. Thus, as with any set of downstream impacts (and like most other
evaluations of the political effects of public programs), the treatment effects on secondary
outcomes should be treated with some caution.
17The 4-year outcomes were derived from a formal model and pre-specified in the analysis of the 2-year
results. As the experiment pre-dated the social science registry, the trial was not formally pre-registered.
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We estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effect on outcomes, Y , via the weighted least squares
(WLS) regression:
Yij = θITTT ij + βXij + γd + εij (1)
where T is an indicator for assignment to treatment for person i in group j, X is the vector of
baseline covariates displayed in Appendix Table B.1, the γ are district fixed effects (required
because the probability of assignment to treatment varies by strata), and ε is an error term
clustered by group. We weight observations by their inverse probability of selection into the
two-phase endline tracking (see Appendix A.2).
We include covariates in part to account for imbalance in baseline characteristics across
arms. Table 1 reports balance tests (for all variables see Appendix B.1). Of 57 covariates,
6 (10.5%) of the treatment-control differences have p < 0.05, and 8 (14.0%) have p < 0.10.
A test of joint significance from an OLS regression on a treatment indicator reveals that
baseline characteristics are jointly significant with p = 0.05. 18
Most members of the control group knew that bureaucrats nominated them for the YOP
lottery. Hence they know their control status. If this loss translated into resentment of the
incumbent, then equation 1 will overstate any increase in incumbent support from treat-
ment. Since we observe the opposite treatment effect (a decline in incumbent support and
an increase in opposition activities), resentment at losing the lottery would understate the
unexpected political effects of YOP. That would not be true if resentment translated into
refusing to answer the survey. But the number of control group members both aware of their
status and who did not respond is unlikely to be large enough to have this effect.19
18For instance, at baseline the treatment group report 2 percentage points more vocational training, 0.07
standard deviations greater wealth, 56% greater savings (though only in the linear, not in log form), and 5
percentage points more access to small loans. Group-level balance tests (the level of randomization) yield
the same conclusions (not shown). The missing 13 control groups could cause the imbalance. We estimate
that if the missing controls had baseline values 0.1 to 0.2 standard deviations above the control mean, it
would account for the full imbalance (see Appendix B.3). If so, the observed control group may be poorer
than the treatment group, and will overstate true program impacts. Our empirical strategy and sensitivity
analysis below explicitly address the concerns that arise from imbalance and potentially selective attrition.
19As noted above, non-response is 7 percentage points greater in the control group, but most of this are 13
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3 Results
3.1 Economic impacts of the program
YOP led to large and persistent increases in investment, work, and income. Blattman et al.
(2014) report detailed ITT estimates on economic outcomes two and four years after the
interventions. Briefly, 89% of groups assigned to a YOP grant received it.20 A majority of
groups and members invested the funds in skills training and business materials, as planned.
Groups reported that they spent about two thirds of the grant on tools and materials, a
tenth on training, and the remainder on miscellaneous other things. They focused on skilled
trades: 38% in tailoring, 23% in carpentry, 13% in metalwork, and 8% in hairstyling. By
2012, assignment to YOP was associated with UGX 224,986 ($130) greater capital stocks, a
57% increase over the control group.
With these investments, YOP led these young people to shift their occupations toward
skilled work and cottage industry, increasing their labor supply overall. After four years,
those assigned to YOP were more than twice as likely to practice a skilled trade, and they
worked 5.5 more hours per week than the control group — a 17% increase.
YOP’s ultimate aim was to increase earned income.21 An index of consumption, asset,
and labor earnings measures of income increased by 0.17 standard deviations with YOP after
two years, and by 0.24 standard deviations after four years. Since these people are fairly
poor and underemployed, this earnings increase is modest in absolute terms — just under a
dollar a day in PPP terms. But relative to the control group’s earnings this is a 38% increase
“never found” groups who did not learn their treatment status. Even if these non-responders did resent the
government in large numbers, there would have to be an extremely powerful connection between resentment
and non-response to overcome the effect of resentful control group members who did respond to the survey
(leading us to understate the fall in incumbent support from YOP).
2021 groups could not access funds because of problems with identifying the group leaders and banking
details, bank complications, collection delays, or corruption. Only 8 groups reported that they never received
funds due to some form of theft or diversion.
21Income is notoriously difficult to measure, especially in poor and rural areas where the average person
has volatile and seasonal work, multiple sources of income, and both monetary and in-kind remuneration.
We measured income in three ways: self-reported earnings, consumption assets owned, and an estimate of
total household consumption. The consumption and asset measures are thought to be better measures of
stable or “permanent” income.
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in cash earnings — a hugely important change for someone earning so little per day.
Both men and women benefited from the program. A third of applicants were women
and the program had large and sustained impacts on them: After four years, incomes of
treatment women were 73% greater than control women, compared to a 29% gain for men.
Over the four years, control men kept pace or caught up with treated men. Women stagnated
without the program but took off when funded. These are extremely large impacts, especially
considering how few employment programs even pass a simple cost-benefit test.22
3.2 Impacts of the program on political behavior
YOP is unlike the sort of clientelistic program most commonly used in transactional politics
and vote-buying, such as public sector jobs. It was a large-scale state employment program
that was foreign-financed, relatively technocratic and non-politicized in its targeting and
implementation, and (unlike a public sector job) the grant was by its nature impossible to
revoke once given.23 Indeed, it transferred resources directly to voters, much like land titling,
conditional cash transfers, or skills training or other public programs. These are commonly
labeled “programmatic policies” rather than pork programs or traditional patronage.
3.2.1 Theory and predictions
There is a growing base of evidence that voters reward incumbents for programmatic policy,
at least in aggregate. For instance, comparing areas with varying exposure to conditional cash
transfer programs in Latin America, Manacorda et al. (2011); Zucco (2013); Diaz-Cayeros
et al. (2016) argue that retrospective voting could account for the fact that areas that
22Blattman and Ralston (2015), in their review of the evidence of the effectiveness of employment programs
in poor, middle-income, and high-income countries, identify the YOP program (and cash transfer programs
like it) as some of the highest return employment programs with evidence in the world.
23One important different between conditional and unconditional transfers is the amount of interaction
individuals have with government. In the YOP case, young people interacted with the government, but in a
limited way and only during the application process or, in limited cases, briefly after receiving funds. Most
conditional cash programs deliver money in tranches over long periods of time, requiring greater interactions
with officials and more reliance on the continuation of the distribution. YOP participants neither needed
nor expected further interactions with government after receiving the program.
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received more assistance rewarded incumbents, sometimes even after the program benefits
had finished.24 Similarly, Casaburi and Troiano (2015) see an increase in incumbent vote
share after a successful anti-tax evasion program, and Larreguy et al. (2015) see incumbent
vote share rise after a land titling program.
The literature provides several reasons why people assigned to treatment should reward a
ruling party for programmatic policies, and together they led us to hypothesize that assign-
ment to treatment would increase partisanship and electoral support for the ruling party.
One is that economically successful voters tend to reward the incumbent. Overall, YOP
recipients experienced a large increase in wealth and may have rewarded the incumbent as
a consequence, independently of whom they attribute the responsibility of the program to.
This idea that voters are naïve and make simple calculations is supported by the literature
on how natural or idiosyncratic events can sometimes boost incumbents’ popularity (e.g.
Healy et al., 2010). One explanation is that poorly informed voters interpret good fortune as
plausible new information about an incumbent’s quality or characteristics (Ashworth et al.,
2016).
A second reason is that voters may reward incumbents if they interpret development pro-
grams as a signal that the incumbent is effective, or that the incumbent will work to benefit
voters like themselves in the future. Relatedly, some theories emphasize reciprocity in voting
— that voters reward incumbents out of a sense of gratitude or perceived obligation—and
this would generate similar predictions to retrospective voting: increased vote share for the
incumbent, at least when they attribute the program to that party or politician.
The YOP program was one of the largest development program ever run in Uganda.
As such YOP could be viewed as a costly signal from the ruling party that it intended to
channel more funds in the future to the north of the country, thus changing the expected
benefits of keeping the party in power.25 This led us to predict that YOP beneficiaries might
24In one case, that of conditional cash transfers in Mexico, it is contested whether incumbent vote share
increased, or whether the effect was purely on turnout (Schober, 2016). Nonetheless, the argument that
incumbent vote share responds to programmatic policy extends well beyond Mexico.
25Of course, for there to be a differential effect on treated individuals, the actual receipt of YOP would
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reciprocate with votes for the ruling party.
Most of these explanations were developed to explain voting in democratic regimes. Yet
Uganda is a multiparty autocracy. While it is possible that the voting calculus could be
very different in a more autocratic regime, in our view the voting calculus in Uganda has
more similarities than differences with more democratic African regimes. As we discussed
above, the poll itself is reasonably free and fair in Uganda. Even in advanced democracies,
many local, state and national elections feature a dominant party that is almost sure to
win. In these cases, two of the most powerful voting explanations are voter’s expressive
preferences, and the strategic value of signaling opposition support in order to influence the
ruling party’s policies or patronage. Autocrats get at least as much informational value from
elections as democratic leaders (Brancati, 2014). In many ways, Ugandan voting behavior
resembles voting behavior in any poor country where politics is highly transactional and
based on powerful ethnic or regional organizations.
In general, at the outset of the study we were not aware of theories or literature leading
us to predict the opposite effect: that YOP could augment support for the opposition. In
retrospect, we found a literature suggesting that rising wealth could mitigate the effects of
patronage on politics. We return to this theory in the discussion and conclusions section
below.
3.2.2 National election outcomes
Three years after the grants, we see no evidence that the program increased general political
participation or support for the ruling party. Rather, if anything, young people assigned to
the treatment increased their support for the opposition.
have to change these expectations. It is possible that treatment and control group members would see or
absorb the signal differently. For instance, NUSAF was widely perceived as corrupt. But those who actually
received the grants have direct evidence that it reaches people like them. Also, any element of reciprocity
would likely affect the actions of YOP recipients. That said, were non-recipients to reward the incumbent
for good policy, this would attenuate the treatment effects in our experiment. This highlights one of the
key differences that separates our study from previous ones: we examine variation between treated and
non-treated individuals in the same locality, rather than treated and non-treated localities.
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Table 2: Impacts on partisan attitudes and actions, by incumbent and opposition party
2012 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control ITT, with controls
Dependent variable in 2012 Mean Coeff. Std. Err. N
Index of NRM/Presidential support (z-score) -0.05 -0.04 [.052] 1858
Would vote NRM if election tomorrow 0.75 -0.02 [.022] 1858
Like or strongly like the NRM 0.81 -0.02 [.020] 1845
Feels close to the NRM 0.55 0.01 [.024] 1833
Worked to get the NRM elected 0.29 0.01 [.023] 1844
Member of the NRM 0.40 -0.02 [.026] 1849
Voted or supported the President in 2011 0.88 -0.04 [.018]** 1755
Approve or strongly approve of President 0.85 -0.02 [.018] 1847
Index of opposition support (z-score) 0.00 0.11 [.053]** 1858
Would vote opposition if election tomorrow 0.17 0.01 [.020] 1858
Like or strongly like any opposition party 0.36 0.03 [.023] 1844
Feels close to any opposition party 0.10 0.03 [.016]** 1833
Worked to get the opposition elected 0.04 0.03 [.011]*** 1844
Member of an opposition party 0.05 0.02 [.013]** 1849
Voted or supported an opposition party in 2011 0.12 0.04 [.018]** 1755
Notes: Column (1) reports the control group mean, weighted by the inverse probability of selection into each endline sample.
Columns (2)-(3) report the estimated intent-to-treat (ITT) coefficient and standard error at endline, using equation 1. Standard
errors are heteroskedastic-robust and clustered by group.
Table 2 reports our main results on the impacts of receiving the program on political
behavior and attitudes towards the ruling party and opposition parties. To reduce the
number of hypotheses being tested, we group outcomes thematically into a small number of
families and calculate a standardized mean effects index of all component outcomes.26 Note
that the survey was conducted four years after the grant and a year after the last election.
Party and political attitudes (e.g. support for the ruling party) are reported at the time
of the survey, while electoral participation and political actions (e.g. attending a rally) are
retrospective measures of pre-election and election activities. For causal identification, this
requires that recall error is not correlated with treatment status.
First, an index of ruling party support — vote intentions, support for, work for, and
membership in the ruling party, plus support for the President in particular — falls by
26We standardize the components, average them, and re-standardize.
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0.05 standard deviations. This is not statistically significant, but the sign of the coefficient
is the opposite of what we expected. Moreover, while 88% of the control group voted for
the President, this declined by 4 percentage points with treatment, significant at the 5%
level. This latter result would not hold after correcting for multiple hypotheses within the
family, and so we must take it cautiously, but it is worth noting that it is probably the
most important political indicator for the national government and it runs in the opposite
direction of our prediction.27 We can certainly rule out an increase in support for the ruling
party.28
Second, support for and actions on behalf of an opposition party increased by 0.11 stan-
dard deviations among those assigned to treatment. The vast majority of opposition support
is for Kizza Besigye and his party, the FDC, but we pool all opposition candidates for this
analysis. Looking at the components of this family index, all treatment effects are posi-
tive.29 The proportionally largest and statistically significant changes are to feeling close
to the opposition party, working for the opposition, being a member of the opposition and
actual voting for the opposition. In this context, “working to get a candidate elected” can
include being a party activist (e.g. organizing events and rallies) but this role is rare, es-
pecially among young people. Rather, in most cases this reflects more informal activities,
such as persuading friends and family to support your candidate or turn out to vote. Formal
get-out-the-vote efforts are actually outlawed on election day in Uganda.
Treatment appears to have increased voting for an opposition candidate from 12% in
27If we adjust for seven comparisons within the family, the coefficient on voting for the President has a
p-value of 0.24. We use the Westfall and Young (1993) free step-down resampling method for the family-wise
error rate (FWER), the probability that at least one of the true null hypotheses will be falsely rejected, using
randomization inference.
28Parish-level data also supports the view that the program’s effect on support for the ruling party was
limited. Using parish-level voting returns in 2011, we can examine the impact of having at least one NUSAF
group assigned in the parish, to see if local populations reward the President for targeting the parish with any
NUSAF project, including a YOP project. Support for the President is 2.2 percentage points higher in these
districts, with a standard deviation of 0.015 (not statistically significant.Table not shown, but the regression
is analogous to the treatment effects estimated above. There are 420 eligible parishes in the sample.
29One feature of our population is that they are mainly under 35, with about a quarter eligible to vote for
the first time. As we illustrate in Appendix B.5, the results are not driven by these young and inexperienced
voters. There is no statistically significant difference between first time and older voters, and if anything the
average treatment effect is slightly higher when we exclude first time voters.
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the control group to 16% in the treatment, a one third increase. While we have to take the
patterns within any family with some caution, note that stated preferences for the opposition
change proportionally less, and are not statistically significant. If we adjust p-values for the
two main family comparisons (NRM/Presidential support and opposition support), the p-
value on the opposition support family index is 0.07.
Robustness Our results are robust to alternate specifications but are sensitive to extreme
attrition scenarios. As noted above, attrition was greater in the control group. If attrition is
correlated with treatment in unobserved ways, then our treatment effects could be spurious
(see Appendix B.4). We have no reason to believe that unfound members of the sample
are any more or less likely to support the NRM or opposition, however, and indeed our
estimates correct for some of the observable determinants of attrition already, including many
of the demographics (wealth, education, ethnicity) that are predictive of party support (see
Appendix B.2).
Unfound respondents would have to be extremely different from found respondents to
account for the size of treatment effect we observe. To give a numerical example, in order
to make the treatment effect on opposition support go away, then arithmetically 22% of
all unfound control group members would have to have voted for the opposition (assuming
found and unfound treatment group members vote the same). This seems implausibly large
given that found members of the control group voted for the opposition roughly 12% of the
time. We do not see remotely this level of selection in any other covariate.
We can also examine exactly how much these observed covariates matter. If we estimate
a simple average treatment effect with strata fixed effects but no covariate controls, we get
a coefficient [standard error] of 0.1206 [0.053] on opposition support. If we add weights to
account for selection into attrition, the estimate changes to 0.1086 [0.054].30 This is closer
to zero, suggesting that attrition did indeed bias the prior treatment effects away from zero.
30We use inverse propensity score weights for the propensity to go unfound based on all covariates, using
the leave-one-out method to estimate weights for each individual in the sample.
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Table 3: Program impacts on general political participation and partisan action, irrespective
of party
2012 sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control ITT, with controls
Dependent variable in 2012 Mean Coeff. Std. Err. N
Index of general electoral political action (z-score) -0.11 0.06 [.053] 1858
Attended voter education meeting 0.48 0.03 [.026] 1858
Got together with other to discuss vote 0.56 -0.03 [.025] 1857
Reported a campaign malpractice 0.10 0.02 [.017] 1857
Voted in the presidential election 0.91 0.00 [.014] 1857
Attended an election rally (0-3) 1.24 0.04 [.050] 1858
Participated in an political primary (0-3) 0.71 0.04 [.049] 1857
Worked to get a candidate/party elected (0-3) 0.64 0.10 [.051]* 1852
Member of a political party (0-3) 0.85 0.02 [.051] 1851
Notes: Column (1) reports the control group mean, weighted by the inverse probability of selection into each endline sample.
Columns (2)–(3) report the estimated intent-to-treat (ITT) coefficient and standard error at endline, using equation 1. Standard
errors are heteroskedastic-robust and clustered by group.
To believe that attrition drives our results, we would have to believe that a set of un-
observed characteristics unrelated to the covariates we observe have an order of magnitude
larger association with treatment and voting. For instance, the control group could only
appear to like the ruling party more, because opposition supporters in the control group are
less likely to answer the survey as they resent being excluded from the program. We regard
these as possible but unlikely scenarios.31
General political behavior Increased political action seems to be concentrated among
opposition supporters, since it is not associated with a similar increase in political partic-
ipation in the full sample. Table 3 reports impacts on political participation in general,
irrespective of party. These include measures from Table 2 where we ignore the ruling
party/opposition distinction, but also includes non-partisan political participation (or po-
31In particular, as we note above, something such as resentment would have to translate mainly into
nonresponse. Because resentful control group members who do respond to the survey will lower the control
group incumbent support, moving it in the same direction as the treatment effect. This could overwhelm
the effects of nonresponse. Thus it seems at least as plausible that we understate the decrease in incumbent
support.
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tentially partisan measures where we do not know the party in question, such as attending
a rally).
The program had little effect on the general index of political participation or any of
the individual components: whether someone attended voter education meetings, met with
others to discuss the election, reporting of malpractice or even whether they voted in the
presidential election. The family index rises by 0.06 standard deviations but has a p-value
of 0.262. 91% of the sample reported voting, perhaps leaving little room for improvement
on this metric, but we likewise see no improvement in the other measures of participation.
The program also had no statistically significant effect on general partisan actions—
including attending a political rally, participating in a primary, working to get a candidate
elected, or being a member of a party. Only one component measure shows any evidence
of change: self-reporting working to get a party elected increased from 64% in the control
group to 74% in the treatment, significant at the 10% level. These effects are largely driven
by the increase in activity on behalf of the opposition.
3.2.3 Local election outcomes
Table 4 displays the program’s impact on support for local politicians. The major elected
positions include local councilors at the district level (called LC5s), at the subcounty level
(called LC3s), and the village level (called LC1s). While LC1s and LC3s may have played
some role in nominating projects to the district, the main nomination process was done at
the district level by unelected bureaucrats who nominated projects to the central government
for funding. In general, LC5s (who have a strong party affiliation) did not have a formal
role in project nomination in the districts. In principle they could have had a behind-the-
scenes role, or be a convenient local target for people’s support for the ruling party or their
antipathy (especially since these races are more competitive than the Presidency). Hence we
tracked local impacts.
We first consider incumbent LC5s who served during the YOP disbursement period and
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Table 4: Program impacts on local political participation and partisanship
2012 Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control ITT, with controls
Dependent variable in 2012 Mean Coeff. Std. Err N
Races with an incumbent LC5 :
Voted or support the previous incumbent LC5 (0-1) 0.560 -0.057 [.037] 890
Races where incumbent was from ruling party 0.650 -0.127 [.042]*** 601
Races where incumbent was from opposition 0.422 0.028 [.069] 289
All races:
Voted in the LC5 election (0-1) 0.867 0.014 [.016] 1852
Approve or Strongly Approve the current LC1 (0-1) 0.795 0.002 [.021] 1853
Approve or Strongly Approve the current LC3 (0-1) 0.784 0.002 [.020] 1856
Approve or Strongly Approve the current LC5 (0-1) 0.773 -0.034 [.022] 1852
Notes: Column (1) reports the control group mean, weighted by the inverse probability of selection into each endline sample.
Columns (2)-(3) report the estimated intent-to-treat (ITT) coefficient and standard error at endline, using equation 1. Standard
errors are heteroskedastic-robust and clustered by group.
re-ran for election. This is about half of all races. The table also displays treatment effects for
whether the individual voted in the LC5 election (a measure of local political participation),
and also the approval for current local councilors. Treatment led to a 5.7 percentage point
decrease in voting for or supporting the incumbent LC5, regardless of party (not significant).
But support for NRM incumbents fell dramatically, by 12.7 percentage points (significant
at the 1% level), while support for opposition incumbents rose slightly (not statistically
significant). We do not have party affiliation data for LC3s, and LC1s are not officially
affiliated with a party. But treatment did not lead to increased support for the current LC1,
LC3, or LC5, nor did it significantly increase the likelihood of voting in the local elections.
4 Discussion
This section lays out the major possible explanations for our results. We see some evidence
that the fall in incumbent support could arise from misattribution, but at least some of the
effect of YOP on opposition support seems to operate through higher incomes.
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4.1 Misattribution
The fact that beneficiaries did not reward the ruling party as we expected could be due to
the fact that respondents simply did not attribute the YOP program or their own selection
to the ruling party. We see only limited evidence for this view. Table 5 presents summary
statistics and treatment effects on respondents’ beliefs about the program. These effects are
post-treatment opinions, however, and so should be taken with some caution. Nonetheless,
a few messages are clear:
• Most respondents correctly attributed the introduction of NUSAF and YOP to either
the central government or a foreign donor (56% and 32% of the control group), typically
the World Bank.32 People assigned to treatment were slightly more likely to assign the
program to a foreign donor, but the difference is not large.
• Most of our sample did not perceive YOP’s invention as a political favor, a form of
patronage, or even a gift. Rather respondents viewed YOP as programmatic in nature.
• Asked about their group’s nomination or selection, most people did not attribute it to
a politician or political motive. When asked who nominated their project, the most
common answers were the unelected district bureaucratic office for NUSAF, or “don’t
know”. They attributed selection to national or local politicians only about 13% of
the time, and treatment had no effect on this perception. Rather treatment led 7% of
people to change their answer from “don’t know” to the specific unelected bureaucratic
office. Most also attributed the reason they were funded as also technocratic or random.
• Those who attribute YOP to someone other than the government were also more
likely to support the opposition. This could simply be partisanship coloring opinions,
but we can’t reject the possibility that misattribution drives our treatment effect on
32Both answers were correct, since NUSAF was funded via a large credit from the World Bank, and
the government received significant technical assistance from the World Bank to implement. Regrettably,
multiple answers were not collected on this survey question, and so we cannot be sure that people did not
attribute the program both to the government and the World Bank.
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Table 5: Self-reported beliefs about the NUSAF program
2012 Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control ITT, with controls
Dependent variable in 2012 Mean Coeff. Std. Err N
Who was mainly responsible for giving N. Uganda the NUSAF program?
The President/NRM/national government 0.559 -0.017 [.024] 1848
District or local politician/official 0.013 0.002 [.005] 1848
Foreign donor (e.g. World Bank, NGO) 0.318 0.025 [.022] 1848
Don’t Know 0.122 -0.012 [.015] 1846
What do you think the main motivation was in giving YOP to the people of northern Uganda?
To develop/assist the north 0.919 0.011 [.012] 1857
To increase political support 0.054 -0.007 [.010] 1858
To make donors happy 0.010 -0.009 [.004]** 1857
Don’t know 0.017 0.005 [.006] 1858
Who selected groups to receive YOP funding?
National government 0.066 0.004 [.013] 1855
District chairperson (elected official) 0.077 0.001 [.015] 1855
NUSAF district technical officer 0.337 0.073 [.022]*** 1855
District executive committee 0.071 0.015 [.013] 1855
Community facilitator 0.098 -0.018 [.014] 1855
No answer 0.350 -0.074 [.023]*** 1858
Why were groups chosen/not chosen for funding?
The best quality projects were selected 0.135 0.319 [.023]*** 1853
Hard work of group leaders/facilitators 0.146 0.074 [.020]*** 1858
Bribe to facilitator 0.010 0.000 [.004] 1853
Relationship with district chairperson 0.073 -0.039 [.011]*** 1853
Random 0.152 -0.050 [.017]*** 1853
Don’t know 0.484 -0.304 [.024]*** 1853
Do you think the selection was fair? 0.422 0.407 [.024]*** 1856
Thinks likely to receive future program next year 0.761 0.026 [.021] 1868
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the control and treatment group means, weighted by the inverse probability of selection into
each endline sample. Columns (3)-(4) report the intent-to-treat (ITT) estimated coefficient and p-value from YOP program
assignment, using equation 1. Standard errors are heteroskedastic-robust and clustered by group.
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incumbent and opposition support. Table 6 reports an ITT regression where we include
post-treatment government attribution as a covariate, and interact it with treatment.
On average, those who attribute YOP to someone other than the government increase
their support for the opposition by 0.166 standard deviations. Opposition support is
0.090 standard deviations lower among those who attribute YOP to the government,
but the coefficient on the interaction is not statistically significant.
• We see little effect of beliefs about program selection on opposition support. Among
those who thought program selection was fair, opposition support rose by 0.138 stan-
dard deviations, compared to 0.123 among those who perceived selection as unfair.
Among those who thought program selection was random, opposition support rose
0.157 standard deviations, compared to 0.123 among those who perceived selection as
non-random (see Appendix B.6).
Overall, a lack of attribution might explain why the ruling party did not get rewarded at
the polls by YOP beneficiaries. But it seems unlikely to explain the decline in Presidential
voting or increased electoral action on behalf of the opposition. Hence there must be another
mechanism.
4.2 Effects of income and financial freedom
One possibility is an income effect of some kind. At least three theories connect income
levels to political behavior.
1. A strand of democratization theory called “modernization theory” argues that eco-
nomic prosperity hastens democratization. This literature usually emphasizes the re-
lationship between economic and political elites. But there is also a “micro” strand
of this literature that argues that reducing poverty creates engaged citizens or more
democratic preferences. One example is Welzel et al. (2003), who marshall theory, case
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Table 6: Heterogeneity in political impacts by post-program attribution
Dependent variable (z-score)
NRM Presidential support Opposition support
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assigned to treatment -0.039 -0.037 0.118 0.166
[0.052] [0.079] [0.053]** [0.082]**
Attributes program to government 0.201 0.203 -0.172 -0.130
[0.049]*** [0.070]*** [0.049]*** [0.068]*
Assigned x Government attribution -0.004 -0.086
[0.098] [0.099]
Observations 1,848 1,848 1,848 1,848
R2 0.107 0.107 0.093 0.093
Notes: This table displays heterogeneity in the ITT results by attribution. Columns (1) and (3) reproduce treatment effects
on partisanship adding a dummy for government attribution from Table 2. In the remaining columns, we include a dummy
for government attribution and an interaction term between the dummy and treatment assignment. Self-reported beliefs about
attribution and selection are post-treatment, and could be affected by treatment status (see Table 5 for ITT effects on these
variables).
evidence, and correlations to argue that anti-poverty programs create more self-aware,
assertive, critical citizens, who will prefer to act on their political ideals.
2. There is also some evidence that financial independence makes citizens more willing
to hold governments accountable. For instance, De Kadt and Lieberman (2015) find
that access to public services is correlated with lower support for incumbents across
Southern Africa. Using attitudinal survey data, they suggest that improvements in
service delivery increase voter expectations of government in terms of service delivery
and corruption, and incumbents are punished for disappointing these expectations.
3. Other evidence suggests that financial independence untangles poor people from clien-
telistic networks. Clientelism is effective in elections principally because some con-
stituents are poor (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). In her qualitative study of Mexican politics
(and the vote buying machine of another semi-autocratic party, the PRI), Magaloni
(2006) argues that financially independent voters are less dependent on favors from the
ruling party, and thus are more likely to support the opposition. Larreguy et al. (2015)
argue that in clientelistic regimes programmatic policies can reduce clients’ dependence
on political patrons and reduce the power of patrons, and that this is a powerful force
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that can cancel out the rewards that come at the polls for good programs. They find
support for this proposition from an urban titling program in Mexico that reduced the
value of clientelistic goods and services that patrons had to offer. Hite-Rubin (2015),
studying an experimental microfinance initiative in the Philippines, also finds that im-
personal microcredit decreased incumbent support. She argues that this is not because
it increases incomes but because it untangles people from the credit relationships that
underlie party politics and turnout efforts. And Bobonis et al. (2017) show that, in
northeast Brazil, vulnerability to drought is associated with closer support for political
parties, and citizens who receive cisterns are less likely to be political clients to a party.
While we cannot reject any of these explanations outright, we think four facts and patterns
weigh in favor of financial independence untangling people from clientelism.
First, while the absolute income effects are small, vote buying in Uganda is also a cheap
affair. Around election time it is common for incumbents, especially the ruling party, to give
very small cash gifts to encourage turnout. A gift may be a few dollars or less. This happens
openly at rallies throughout the lead-up to the election, and secretly in the days right before
election day. Opposition parties have significantly fewer funds for vote buying, and so this
is an predominantly ruling party tactic (Blattman et al., 2016). In principle, with greater
income, people who received YOP may have chosen to trade off their chances of a cash gift
at election time (or other political patronage) in order to act on an intrinsic preference for
publicly supporting their preferred party.
Second, people change their political behaviors in support of a party, rather than their
party preferences. Across the political outcomes displayed in Table 2, the largest and most
statistically significant impacts are on actions (voting, joining a party, or acting on behalf
of a party) and not party preference. Given the large number of components, we must take
these impacts with some caution. The differences across components are not statistically
significant. Nonetheless, the pattern is consistent with people changing behaviors more than
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partisan preferences.33 We view this pattern as more consistent with relative financial free-
dom changing people’s public actions and identity, rather than underlying policy preferences.
Third, active and public opposition support is correlated with wealth, and increases in
wealth are associated with increases in opposition support.34 This too is consistent with
the hypothesis that relative financial independence reduces clientelism. Table 7 reports five
OLS regressions examining the relationship between the endline index of opposition support
(from Table 2) and the endline income index.
Higher incomes are associated with more active and public opposition support. In Column
1 of Table 7, we report the results from a regression of opposition support on endline income
for the control group only, controlling for all baseline covariates (including baseline income).
This is not a causal estimate of income on opposition support, but it does indicate how the
variation in income that is not explained by demographics or initial income correlates with
opposition support. It is moderate in size (0.13 standard deviations) and significant at the
1% level. It is roughly similar to the correlation in the full sample, in Column 2.35
We can also examine the evidence on income as a mediating factor, and try to estimate
how much of the effect on opposition support is due to a rise in income. Column 3 replicates
the simple ITT on opposition support from Table 2, as a baseline reference. Column 5 adds
the endline income index, while column 5 also includes 8 other potential mechanisms (for
simplicity and consistency, we include every outcome family reported in either this paper or
33The change in political behavior is not large, compared to the relatively large income impact of YOP.
Possibly the elasticity of political behavior change to income change is small. But then, the income change is
small in absolute terms. The relevant benchmark might not control group incomes, but rather the economic
and political benefits that come from supporting the opposition.
34Note, however, that this is a period of general growth and incomes rose over time for both the treatment
and control groups. Incomes simply increased more for the treatment group. If there were a mechanical
connection between wealth and opposition support we might expect to see a generalized increase in opposition
support. This implies that the relative wealth gain is important. We can only speculate why this might be
the case. It could be that the price of a vote is proportional to income, or something else about the general
political equilibrium that only relative income differences matter.
35If we omit the baseline covariates, we estimate nearly identical OLS coefficients on income (regressions
not shown). If we make the very strong assumption that all effects on opposition support are mediated
through income changes (i.e. the exclusion restriction) then we can use assignment to treatment as an
instrument for the effect of income on opposition support. This IV coefficient (not shown) is roughly four
times as large as the OLS coefficients. It is biased upwards by any other mediators correlated with treatment,
income and opposition support. Thus we must take it with caution.
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Table 7: Opposition support and income
Dependent variable: Index of opposition support in 2012 (z-score)
Control
group
Full sample Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Assigned to treatment 0.115 0.086 0.106
[0.053]** [0.052]* [0.047]**
2012 income, z-score 0.131 0.125 0.119 0.097
[0.043]*** [0.031]*** [0.031]*** [0.028]***
Kin relations (z-score)
0.082
[0.028]***
Community participation
(z-score)
-0.007
[0.023]
Public good contributions
(z-score)
-0.003
[0.023]
Anti-social behavior (z-score)
0.002
[0.029]
Protest attitudes and
participation (z-score)
-0.069
[0.027]**
Has migrated since baseline 0.037
[0.032]
Index of 2011 election
influence (z-score)
0.334
[0.033]***
Existence of a patron (z-score)
0.141
[0.070]**
Group cooperation (z-score) -0.003
[0.011]
Observations 934 1,858 1,858 1,858 1,850
Baseline controls and district
fixed effects?
Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The 2012 income index is a standardized mean effects index of reported earnings, non-durable consumption, and durable
assets. The other outcome indexes represent mean effects indexes of all outcomes analyzed in this paper or the original economic
impact analysis in Table VIII of Blattman et al. (2014). Treatment effects on these other outcomes are reported in Appendix
B.10. Columns (1) and (2) report the OLS regression of opposition support on income in the control group and the full sample.
Column (3) replicates the simple ITT on opposition support, from Table 2 above, for comparison purposes. Columns (4) and
(5) examine possible mediators of the treatment effect, adding first the endline income measure then all outcome indexes.
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Blattman et al. (2014)).36 The results suggest income is a mediating factor. After controlling
for income in 2012 (columns 3 versus 4), the treatment effect on opposition support falls
by 25% (p < 0.01), while endline income is just as correlated with opposition support as in
Columns 1 and 2. This suggests that a large fraction of the treatment effect we see in Column
4 is coming through an increase in income. When we add in the other eight mechanisms
and compare columns 4 and 5, the treatment effect remains similar to that in column 4 (a
difference of 2.0 percentage points, p = 0.27). Although the coefficient on income slightly
drops when adding in these eight mechanisms (p = 0.05), the correlation between endline
income and opposition support is still high and positive (p < 0.01). This suggests that
a large portion of the effect we observe on opposition support comes through increases in
income.37
Fourth, recall that support for the ruling party falls quite steeply at the local but not the
national level. One possibility is that, at the national level, the impact of higher incomes
on opposition support is counterbalanced by gratitude for the national government’s role.
Thus votes for the President could moves very little, because the two effects balance out. At
the local level, however, this attribution and reciprocity effect are much smaller. Thus the
income effects of the program weigh more heavily in political behavior. We view this as a
speculative but interesting hypothesis.
Finally, a reasonable implication of the financial freedom story is that treatment should
increase the respondent’s independence from party operators and patrons. We see mixed
evidence on this front. Table 8 reports treatment effects on instances of election influence
36Six of these (family cohesion, community participation, public good contributions, anti-social behaviors,
protest index, and migration) are families secondary outcomes from Blattman et al. (2014) while the other
two (election intimation and existence of a patron) are families of secondary political variables collected for
the purpose of the paper. These encompass all secondary outcomes collected during the four year follow-up.
37While other endline indexes are significantly correlated with opposition support, this is not sufficient to
mediate the effect of treatment on income. To do so, they must also be correlated with treatment, and none
are correlated with both treatment and the outcome to a significant degree other than income. This is why
we see no fall in the treatment effect when variables are added to Column 6. We expand on this in Appendix
B.7, where we perform a more formal mediation analysis. Consistent with the findings reported here, we
estimate that almost 25 percent of the treatment effect comes from the measured increase in income—large
compared to other mediation analyses of this nature.
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Table 8: Program impacts on other political outcomes
Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control ITT, with controls
Dependent variable in 2012 Mean Coeff. Std. Err. N
Index of 2011 election influence (z-score) 0.03 0.04 [.049] 1858
Was offered money in exchange for vote (0-3) 0.52 0.06 [.048] 1857
Was threatened during campaign (0-3) 0.23 0.04 [.034] 1857
Was intimidated during campaign (0-3) 0.90 -0.01 [.057] 1857
Was taken to the poll on election day 0.04 -0.02 [.008]** 1858
Any of patrons tried to influence you 0.22 0.02 [.019] 1839
Existence of a patron (z-score) -0.09 0.14 [.050]*** 1850
There is a family member he can go to if in need 0.39 0.04 [.024]* 1844
There is a big man he can go to if in need 0.29 0.04 [.024]* 1840
There is politician he can go to if in need 0.23 0.07 [.021]*** 1837
Any of patrons tried to influence you during 2011 election 0.22 0.02 [.019] 1839
Notes: Column (1) reports the control group mean, weighted by the inverse probability of selection into each endline sample.
Columns (2)-(3) report the estimated intent-to-treat (ITT) coefficient and standard error at endline, using equation 1. Standard
errors are heteroskedastic-robust and clustered by group.
and patron-client ties. We do not see any significant change in most threats and incentives
to vote. Treated people were, however, about half as likely to be taken to the poll on election
day — a fall of 2 percentage points relative to a mean of 4 percentage points in the control
group. The mean is low because such voter mobilization on election day is outlawed in
Uganda. A mean effects index of election influence shows no statistically significant impact.
YOP increases the likelihood of having a patron, but this is not the kind of patron that
mobilizes people for elections.38
38Only 22% of respondents reported that a patron tried to influence their electoral actions, and this
increased by 2 percentage points (not significant) with treatment. We only asked about attempts to influence,
not success, and so this does not rule out the possibility that the treated disentangled themselves from election
pressure and patronage. But nor is the pattern consistent with the financial freedom story. One interpretation
is that business activities and wealth strengthen general financial and social networks, including political
networks. Another is that active and public support for a political party (in this case, opposition parties)
creates political connections.
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4.3 Measurement error
Our outcomes are self-reported and, in principle, are vulnerable to systematic measurement
error. We would estimate a false treatment effect if people who received YOP were more
likely to report voting for the opposition, or otherwise express their opposition preferences
publicly. This could arise, for example, because the control group aspires to future gov-
ernment programs and thinks that saying they voted for the President will increase their
chances, even when talking to a supposedly independent study firm.
Social desirability or other bias is a risk, but we think it is unlikely for four reasons.
First, the survey asked people whether they expected to receive future transfers, and 76% of
both the treatment and control groups said they felt it was likely they or their group would
receive a program from a charity or the government in the future. There is no difference.
Second, systematic measurement error is difficult to reconcile with the pattern of treatment
effects we observe, in particular the absence of any impact on attitudes towards the ruling
party and its challengers. It is possible that treatment affects the likelihood of reporting
opposition voting/membership/activities but not party support, but this narrows the set
of plausible systematic measurement error stories that could explain our results. Third,
as with attrition (discussed above) the degree of systematic measurement error correlated
with treatment would have to be huge to account for our treatment effects. Finally, we also
check for potential bias introduced from enumerator effects and find little evidence of their
presence.39
39Di Maio and Fiala (2017) discuss how enumerator effects can significantly impact responses for sensitive
political questions such as were asked in this survey. While enumerator bias is difficult or impossible to
eliminate, they suggest a way to check that the bias is at least balanced by treatment status by examining
the adjusted R-squared in a regression where treatment status is the outcome variable and enumerator
dummies are the explanatory variables. When we do this we obtain an adjusted R2 of 0.049 for assigned
to treatment and 0.046 for actually treated. We consider this to be a relatively low number, considering no
effort was made to balanced enumerators, and conclude that any bias introduced form enumerator effects is
likely similar in treatment and control samples.
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4.4 Other explanations
A handful of other mechanisms are possible, but we do not have the data to judge. One
possibility, for example, is that increased opposition political engagement could arise from
group socialization. People needed to apply in groups. About half of the groups existed prior
to the application. Ongoing group interaction could have exposed youth to different political
ideas, lowering the cost of political action. We do not have data to test this possibility, but it
seems reasonable that new groups would have a bigger effect. But if we compare treatment
effects between groups that existed prior to the program to the ones that were created for
the purpose of applying for the grant, we find that treatment has the largest effects among
pre-existing groups, not new ones.
Finally, the program may have shaped political behaviors by increasing beneficiaries’
exposure to the state.40 For many young people, this may have been one of their first
interactions with a state program, local and national. To the extent they perceived the
program as poorly designed, corrupt, or otherwise problematic, it could have colored their
view of the national and local politicians, or even increased their own sense of efficacy.
Perhaps this explains lower support for the ruling party. Unfortunately, we have no data to
test this.
5 Conclusions
We analyze the political consequences of a large-scale, successful employment program in
Uganda. We find that, rather than rewarding the incumbent ruling party for this program-
matic policy, treated young people are slightly less likely to vote for the President and are
more likely to engage in campaigning for the opposition. There are multiple possible mech-
anisms. We see suggestive evidence for at least one: that opposition support is associated
40Looking at U.S. welfare recipients, for instance, Soss (1999) finds that beneficiaries develop program-
specific beliefs about the usefulness of political participation, their efficacy, and state effectiveness. Moreover
local politicians may have used this opportunity to attempt to claim credit for the program (Guiteras and
Mobarak, 2016).
37
with wealth increases, and this is consistent with a story where more successful youth are
able to vote their conscience rather than succumb to incentives or pressures to support the
ruling party. Of course, we cannot rule out other channels, and do not wish to do so. The
income channel is likely only a part of the story. We simply do not have strong evidence for
or against most of the alternatives.
Prior evidence has often pointed in the opposite direction—that incumbents are rewarded
for patronage and programmatic policies—and so it is possible that this result is unique to
Uganda or even this context. We would expect context to play a huge role in any treat-
ment effect of a policy on political behavior, and any number of factors could influence the
recipient’s reaction to YOP: the nature of the program, the issues at play in this election,
or the fact that these are largely first and second-time voters. For example, many of the
other programs that have been studied examine repeated cash transfers over time, rather
than one-time grants, allowing political parties to claim credit repeatedly. These program
features could change the political interpretation and effects.
The Government of Uganda did not continue to run YOP-like programs under the second
incarnations of NUSAF. Based on our interviews with World Bank and government officials,
we believe this was due to general political difficulties with implementing cash grant pro-
grams. While the government has a sincere interest in developing the north, policy makers
have been concerned about giving out cash. Other similar programs, like livestock distribu-
tion, are common in government programming. In order to continue the spirit of YOP, but
in a significantly cheaper manner, the government is pursuing a number of loan guarantee
programs, where youth that do not have access to credit pay back loans that have been
guaranteed by the government.
Nonetheless, the direction of our treatment effect runs against the received wisdom.
Prominent reviews of the literature on distributive politics have called attention to incomplete
evidence and possible publication bias. For example, Golden and Min (2013) note that, “it is
hard not to suspect that the cases that are studied are often selected precisely because they
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display prima facie evidence of political distortions in allocative decisions” (p.86). They go
on to note that “either that the study of allocations is incomplete, a problem identified by
Cox (2010), or that the cumulative results of this research agenda are biased—or both.”
The answer is especially important for aid agencies who support supposedly program-
matic policies. Scholars and politicians have warned that aid might help rulers stick to power
by indirectly undermining development of civil society. Regimes also commonly target aid
towards political supporters, translating aid into votes (Jablonski, 2014; Hodler and Raschky,
2014). Uganda, for example, has a semi-autocratic regime that tries to use programs and
patronage to insulate itself from competition. It thus seems important to understand how
large aid programs affect local politics. But in spite of the high political stakes of national
development programs, Western donors prefer to view their development interventions in
solely technical terms, overlooking how their reforms and resources affect the balance of
political power in the country (Ferguson, 1990).
This particular program evaluation is also important because there are relatively few
examples of government interventions that increase incomes. Most microfinance and skills
training interventions are implemented by NGOs and seldom have any impact on employment
or earnings. Unconditional cash transfers, livestock, or asset transfer programs have had
more success at increasing employment and earnings, but these studies have generally not
measured changes in political behavior (Blattman and Ralston, 2015). This suggests there is
an important opportunity to conduct more “downstream experiments”, collecting political
opinion data from the beneficiaries of existing evaluations of government programs.
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Appendix for online publication
A Additional design details
A.1 Was NUSAF politically targeted?
As discussed in Section 2.2, we see little correlation between NUSAF funding and the per-
centage of votes cast for the ruling NRM party in the previous election at the subcounty
level.
Figure 1 presents the NUSAF funding per capita (in Ugandan Shillings) for each of the
districts in northern Uganda and the percent of the vote going to the NRM.41 For any level
of support, the majority of districts are in the same range, approximately 10,000 USH to
30,000 USH of funding per person. The one exception is Kitgum district, where funding
per capita was very high. As this was the most conflict affected area, and NUSAF was on
paper a post-conflict development project, it is likely that funding was purposefully targeted
to this area for this mission. However, it is also the district with the lowest support of the
NRM, and so could have been subject to manipulation by the central government. In either
case, due to funding issues described in the main paper, Kitgum is not part of our sample
here.
Manipulation of funding destination by the central government could also have been
achieved at the subcounty level, though this would have been a harder level to target due
to the complexity of the budgeting process in Uganda and the large number of subcounties
present. Table A.1 presents the results of a test for the correlation between the percent of
votes for the NRM and the natural log of the funds per capita in each of the subcounties.
The first column shows there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between
percent of votes and funding. However, this result is once again heavily skewed by data from
41The data on NUSAF funding comes from administrative records that include all NUSAF projects funded
from 2004 to July 2007, one year before the disbursement to the YOP sample and about a year after the
most recent national election. Data on election returns come from
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Figure A.1: NUSAF Funding and NRM voter share
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Notes: This figure presents a scatterplot of NRM voter share in 2006 and
the log of total NUSAF funding per capita by the subcounty level.
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Table A.1: Correlation between voter share and NUSAF funding
Outcome: 2006 NRM voter share
No district fixed effects District fixed effects
Correlation p-value Correlation p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log of NUSAF funding per capita -0.660 <0.01 -0.120 0.78
Observations 313 313
R2 0.04 0.27
Notes: This table displays the results of a regression of 2006 NRM voter share on the log of
NUSAF funding per capita on the subcounty level. We exclude district fixed effects in columns
(1) and (2) and include them in columns (3) and (4). Standard errors are heteroskedastic-
robust.
Kitgum district. In the second column we include district dummies. The results are now
much smaller and not significant.
A.2 Two-stage surveys and response rates
Both endline surveys (2010 and 2012) were rolled out in two phases In Phase 1, we attempted
to interview all 2,677 people in their last known location. In 2010, 37% were not found in
their last know location, rising to 39% in 2012, and so they became eligible for tracking in
Phase 2. In Phase 2, we selected a random sample of the unfound—53% in 2010 and 38.5%
in 2012—stratifying by district and by the proportion unfound in the group for in-depth
tracking. For this subset of unfound groups, we made three attempts to find them in their
new locations and found 75% of them in 2010 and 59% in 2012. In the analysis, groups are
weighted to account for this two-stage process. Those found in Phase 1 receive unit weight,
those selected for Phase 2 tracking are weighted by the inverse of their selection probability,
while those not selected for Phase 2 tracking are dropped. We have no reports of survey
refusal, and no reward was offered for survey completion. See table A.2 for a more detailed
presentation of effective response rates.
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Table A.2: Survey response rates
Selection and tracking, by survey phase Effective response rates
Survey Total
sought
Found,
phase1
Select,
phase 2
Found,
phase 2
Final # of
observations
All Control Treatment Difference
(percent-
age
points)
p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
2008 baseline 2,677 97.0% - - 2,598 97.0% 94.4% 99.8% 5.3 <0.001
2010 endline 2,677 63.4% 53.0% 74.7% 2,005 85.4% 85.6% 85.3% -0.8 0.717
2012 endline 2,677 61.0% 38.5% 58.6% 1,868 82.1% 79.1% 85.5% 7.1 0.004
Notes: Column (1) reports the full study sample sought in each round–in general, five people per group over 535 groups, save for one groups where baseline
data on seven individuals was accidentally collected. Column (2) reports the percentage of these found in a first survey phase, where each respondent was
sought at least once in the town they lived at baseline. Each endline had a second survey phase that tracked a random sample of migrants and other unfound
individuals, and Column (3) reports average percentage randomly selected. This percentage varied exogenously by stratum according to the proportion missing
and expense of tracking in that district. Column (4) reports the percentage of those sought in phase two successfully surveyed. Column (5) reports the final
number of observations by survey round. Columns (6)-(9) report the corresponding response rates overall, by treatment status, and the treatment-control
difference (calculated via regression, controlling for baseline district). Columns (6)-(9) are weighted by the inverse probability of selection in phase two of the
survey (which varies by strata, with weights ranging from 1 to 4), and are referred to as "effective" response rates. Unfound respondents randomly dropped in
phase two receive zero weight. Column (10) reports p-value on the difference term, using robust standard errors clustered at the group level.
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A.3 Survey experiment
To manipulate participant ideas about the implementation of the program, we conducted a
survey experiment during the four-year endline. The goal of the survey experiment was to
manipulate respondents’ ideas about who was behind the implementation of the program
(World Bank versus the government) and how participants were selected (randomly selected
or nominated by the LC V). Individuals were randomized into one of five groups and in each
group the introductory script of the survey varied along these two dimensions.
1. World Bank, Random. These surveys emphasized that the program was principally
made possible by the action of the World Bank and that the groups were selected
randomly to receive funding.
2. World Bank, LC V. These surveys emphasized that the program was principally
made possible by the action of the World Bank, but groups were selected by the NUSAF
district technical officer (NDTO) under the supervision of the LC V Chairperson.
3. Government, Random. These surveys emphasized that the program was principally
made possible by the action of the government and that the groups were selected
randomly to receive funding.
4. Government, LC V. These surveys emphasized that the program was principally
made possible by the action of the government, but groups were selected by the NDTO
under the supervision of the LC V Chairperson.
5. Neutral. None of the above information was presented.
Table A.3 displays the results of our survey experiment. We regress program attribution
on an indicator for completing a survey where the introduction said the Government/World
Bank was behind the program, including covariates and block fixed effects. We do the same
for indicators for the randomization prompt. The results show that the experiment was
not successful: individuals who were told the government was behind the program were 5
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Table A.3: Survey experiment results
First stage attribution First stage selection
Government World Bank Random Not random
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attribute program to: Believes selection was
Government -0.03 -0.04 Random 0.02 0.02
[.031] [.030] [.017] [.018]
World Bank 0.05 0.04 Not random -0.02 -0.02
[.029]* [.028] [.017] [.018]
Notes: This table displays ITT results from our survey experiment. In column (1), we regress program attribution
on an indicator for completing a survey where the introduction said the government was behind the program
plus covariates and block fixed effects. In column (2), we include an indicator for completing a survey that said
the World Bank was behind the program. In column (3), we regress believe in selection process on an indicator
for completing a survey where the introduction said selection was random plus covariates and block fixed effects.
In column (4), we include an indicator for completing a survey that said selection was not random.
percentage points more likely to believe the World Bank funded the program. Similarly,
individuals who were told selection was not random were 2 percentage points less likely to
believe selection was not random.
B Additional analysis
B.1 Baseline balance
Table B.1 displays the results of a regression of treatment on each baseline covariate, con-
trolling for district fixed effects and clustering standard errors by group.
B.2 Correlates of attrition
Table B.2 examines baseline correlates of attrition. We regress an indicator for attrition
on all baseline covariates including district fixed effects. Those who are younger, more risk
averse or work as casual laborers are more likely to attrit. Since attrition is higher among
the young and initially poorer, the average impact of treatment is predicted to be higher.
At the same time, the more literate are more likely to be unfound and so this could depress
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Table B.1: Baseline balance
Control Control - Treat
Mean SD Diff p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grant amount applied for, USD 7,497.44 2,219.95 143.82 0.29
Applicant group size 22.53 6.83 0.03 0.96
Grant amount per member, USD 363.05 159.40 14.09 0.25
Group existed before application 0.45 0.50 0.03 0.42
Group age, in years 3.80 2.00 -0.05 0.80
Within-group heterogeneity (z-score) -0.03 0.92 -0.03 0.75
Quality of group dynamic (z-score) -0.02 1.02 0.05 0.53
Distance to educational facilities (km) 6.84 6.50 0.48 0.35
Individual unfound at baseline 0.06 0.23 -0.05 0.00
Age at baseline 24.75 5.22 0.17 0.55
Female 0.35 0.48 -0.02 0.38
Large town or urban area 0.23 0.42 -0.02 0.61
Risk aversion index (z-score) -0.02 1.00 -0.01 0.75
Any leadership position in group 0.28 0.45 -0.00 0.88
Group chair or vice-chair 0.11 0.31 0.01 0.33
Weekly employment, hours 10.70 15.82 0.57 0.48
All non-agricultural work 5.99 12.47 -0.45 0.44
Casual labor, low skill 1.03 5.19 -0.11 0.63
Petty business, low skill 2.24 6.95 0.21 0.52
Skilled trades 1.78 8.41 -0.33 0.40
High-skill wage labor 0.04 0.58 0.08 0.02
Other non-agricultural work 0.91 4.76 -0.29 0.10
All agricultural work 4.66 10.08 1.04 0.04
Weekly household chores, hours 8.96 17.59 0.30 0.73
Zero employment hours in past month 0.48 0.50 -0.04 0.18
Main occupation is non-agricultural 0.26 0.44 0.00 0.92
Engaged in a skilled trade 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.81
Currently in school 0.04 0.21 -0.01 0.45
Highest grade reached at school 7.95 2.92 -0.07 0.62
Able to read and write minimally 0.75 0.43 -0.03 0.17
Received prior vocational training 0.07 0.26 0.02 0.07
Digit recall test score 4.16 2.00 -0.04 0.64
Index of physical disability 8.68 2.52 -0.14 0.29
Wealth Index -0.16 0.96 0.07 0.12
Savings in past 6 mo. (000s 2008 UGX) 19.25 98.19 10.89 0.02
Monthly gross cash earnings (000s 2008 UGX) 62.19 129.04 6.89 0.30
Can obtain 100,000 UGX ($58) loan 0.33 0.47 0.05 0.01
Can obtain 1,000,000 UGX ($580) loan 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.46
Continued on following page
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Table 10: Baseline balance (continued)
Control Control - Treat
Mean SD Diff p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Registered to vote in 2006 0.92 0.27 -0.01 0.57
Voted in 2006 presidential election 0.73 0.45 0.03 0.21
Voted in 2005 referendum 0.60 0.49 0.01 0.67
Voted in 2005 district election 0.68 0.47 0.01 0.59
Member of a political party 0.11 0.31 0.02 0.06
Participated in election of community leaders in past year 0.45 0.50 0.01 0.72
Attended community meetings in past month 0.47 0.50 -0.00 0.83
Is a community mobilizer 0.45 0.50 -0.01 0.50
Currently a community leader 0.26 0.44 0.01 0.61
Currently on a community committee 0.17 0.38 0.01 0.60
Would accept nomination to be community leader 0.68 0.47 -0.01 0.75
Ethnicity: Acholi 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
Ethnicity: Alur 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.37
Ethnicity: Bagwere 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.24
Ethnicity: Iteso 0.14 0.35 -0.02 0.20
Ethnicity: Karamojong 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.84
Ethnicity: Langi 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.74
Ethnicity: Lugbara 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.66
Ethnicity: Madi 0.08 0.26 0.01 0.58
Observations 1574
p value on F-statistics on all covariates 0.045
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the control mean and standard deviation, respectively.
A small number of missing values are imputed at the median. Column (3) and (4) report
the difference between control and treatment and corresponding p-value from ordinary least
squares regressions of each baseline covariate on a treatment indicator, controlling for block
fixed effects and clustering by group.
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their predicted returns from a grant.
B.3 Sensitivity of baseline balance to baseline non-response
Table B.3 looks at the sensitivity of randomization balance to alternate values for the miss-
ing control groups. The table examines four baseline covariates displaying randomization
imbalance at baseline: durable assets, prior vocational training, ability to obtain a 100,000
UGX loan, and savings in the past 6 months. All covariates are standardized and missing
data in the treatment group are imputed to the mean, or zero. However, missing control
group data are imputed to the mean (zero) plus 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, or 0.25 SD of the
covariate, thus gradually increasing the values of the covariates in the control group towards
balance. In general, imputed values of 0.10 to 0.20 SD are sufficient to bring the regression
differences to zero.
B.4 Robustness
We perform two sets of additional treatment analyses. First, as shown in Table B.5, our
results are robust to alternative regression specifications. Column 1 displays coefficients
from our preferred specification in the paper. In columns 2 to 5, we test four alternate
specifications. First, we drop all controls and only include randomization block fixed effects.
In the second specification, we add only demographic covariates. Next, we add all human
and physical capital controls. The last specification shows group-level effects (the unit of
randomization).
Second, we check that our results are robust to alternative attrition scenarios. In Ta-
bleB.6, we calculate lower and upper bounds for the coefficients of our three main dependent
variables: Index of NRM/Presidential support, index of opposition support, and index of
general election political action. Following Karlan et al. 2015, we calculate lower bounds
(Panel A) by imputing relatively high values to missing observations in the control group
(control group mean plus 0.025, 0.05, 0.10 or 0.50 SD of the found control distribution), and
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Table B.2: Correlates of attrition
Dependent variable: Indicator for attrition
2010 endline 2012 endline
Baseline covariate Coeff. Std. Err. Effect of 1
SD change
in covariate
Coeff. Std. Err. Effect of 1
SD change
in covariate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assigned to treatment 0.020 [0.020] . -0.050 [0.023] .
Grant amount applied for, USD 0.000 [0.000] -0.030 0.000 [0.000] 0.000
Group size 0.000 [0.005] 0.003 -0.005 [0.004] -0.034
Grant amount per member, USD 0.000 [0.000] 0.035 0.000 [0.000] -0.010
Group existed before application -0.016 [0.024] . -0.030 [0.025] .
Group age, in years 0.001 [0.005] 0.002 -0.002 [0.006] -0.003
Within-group heterogeneity (z-score) 0.013 [0.011] 0.013 0.026 [0.013]** 0.026
Quality of group dynamic (z-score) 0.008 [0.013] 0.008 -0.009 [0.016] -0.009
Distance to educational facilities (km) 0.002 [0.002] 0.015 0.000 [0.003] -0.002
Age at baseline -0.003 [0.002]* -0.018 -0.006 [0.002]*** -0.030
Large town/urban area 0.081 [0.030]*** . 0.143 [0.036]*** .
Risk aversion index (z-score) 0.039 [0.011]*** 0.039 0.046 [0.012]** 0.046
Management committee member -0.044 [0.018]** . -0.042 [0.024] .
Chairperson or vice-chairperson 0.013 [0.027] . 0.023 [0.036] .
Weekly work hours: Casual labor 0.003 [0.002]* 0.017 0.003 [0.003] 0.013
Weekly work hours: Own business 0.001 [0.001] 0.005 -0.001 [0.002] -0.010
Weekly work hours: Skilled trades 0.002 [0.001]* 0.018 0.000 [0.002] 0.004
Weekly work hours: High-skill wage labor 0.001 [0.009] 0.001 -0.017 [0.010] -0.014
Weekly work hours: Other non-ag work 0.003 [0.003] 0.013 -0.002 [0.002] -0.007
Weekly work hours: All agricultural work -0.005 [0.001]*** -0.056 -0.005 [0.001] -0.052
Weekly household chores, hours -0.001 [0.000] -0.012 -0.001 [0.001] -0.017
Zero employment hours in past month -0.134 [0.032]*** . -0.149 [0.034] .
Main occupation is non-agricultural -0.171 [0.037]*** . -0.094 [0.047] .
Engaged in a skilled trade -0.061 [0.036]* . -0.043 [0.053] .
Currently in school -0.083 [0.034]** . -0.067 [0.052] .
Highest grade reached at school -0.002 [0.003] -0.007 0.000 [0.004] 0.000
Able to read and write minimally 0.065 [0.021]*** . 0.048 [0.026] .
Received prior vocational training -0.034 [0.030] . -0.051 [0.037] .
Digit recall test score -0.008 [0.004]** -0.016 0.016 [0.006]*** 0.033
Index of physical disability -0.006 [0.002]*** -0.014 -0.002 [0.003] -0.004
Durable assets (z-score) 0.016 [0.011] 0.017 -0.008 [0.012] -0.009
Savings in past 6 mo. (000s 2008 UGX) 0.000 [0.000] 0.011 0.000 [0.000]*** 0.035
Monthly cash earnings (000s 2008 UGX) 0.000 [0.000]* -0.014 0.000 [0.000] -0.017
Can obtain 100,000 UGX ($58) loan -0.024 [0.020] . -0.011 [0.022] .
Can obtain 1,000,000 UGX ($580) loan -0.014 [0.028] . 0.005 [0.037] .
Observations 2,232 2,111
Mean of dependent variable -0.146 -0.179
p-value on F-test of joint significance, all covariates <0.001 <0.001
Notes: Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) report the coefficients and standard errors from a weighted least squares regression of an indicator for attrition
on the baseline covariates used in all treatment effects regressions and listed in Table II (excluding the indicator for unfound at baseline). Weights
are the inverse of the probability of selection into endline tracking. To provide a sense of magnitude, columns (3) and (6) report the product of
the standard deviation of the baseline variable (in Table II) and the coefficients in Columns (1) and (4), with the exception of indicator variables.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the group level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.3: Sensitivity of baseline randomization balance to imputation of missing control
group data
Baseline covariate
exhibiting treatment
imbalance (z-score)
Missing Balance statistics with imputed control group data
control group Control group Treatment group Regression difference
data imputed to Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs Coeff. p-value
the mean plus: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Durable assets +0.05 SD -0.01 0.95 1,352 0.05 1.06 1,325 0.03 0.49
+0.10 SD 0.02 0.97 1,352 0.05 1.06 1,325 0.01 0.90
+0.15 SD 0.05 1.00 1,352 0.05 1.06 1,325 -0.02 0.69
+0.20 SD 0.07 1.05 1,352 0.05 1.06 1,325 -0.05 0.39
+0.25 SD 0.10 1.10 1,352 0.05 1.06 1,325 -0.08 0.20
Prior vocational
training
+0.05 SD 0.02 0.97 1,352 0.02 1.04 1,325 0.04 0.39
+0.10 SD 0.05 0.99 1,352 0.02 1.04 1,325 0.01 0.83
+0.15 SD 0.08 1.02 1,352 0.02 1.04 1,325 -0.02 0.70
+0.20 SD 0.11 1.07 1,352 0.02 1.04 1,325 -0.05 0.36
+0.25 SD 0.13 1.12 1,352 0.02 1.04 1,325 -0.07 0.17
Can obtain 100,000
UGX loan
+0.05 SD -0.02 0.96 1,352 0.09 1.02 1,325 0.09 0.03
+0.10 SD 0.01 0.99 1,352 0.09 1.02 1,325 0.06 0.15
+0.15 SD 0.04 1.02 1,352 0.09 1.02 1,325 0.03 0.45
+0.20 SD 0.07 1.07 1,352 0.09 1.02 1,325 0.01 0.89
+0.25 SD 0.09 1.12 1,352 0.09 1.02 1,325 -0.02 0.68
Savings in past 6 mo. +0.05 SD -0.02 0.82 1,352 0.06 1.16 1,325 0.06 0.11
+0.10 SD 0.01 0.84 1,352 0.06 1.16 1,325 0.03 0.39
+0.15 SD 0.03 0.88 1,352 0.06 1.16 1,325 0.01 0.87
+0.20 SD 0.06 0.94 1,352 0.06 1.16 1,325 -0.02 0.65
+0.25 SD 0.09 1.00 1,352 0.06 1.16 1,325 -0.05 0.33
Notes: This table recalculates balance for four baseline covariates displaying randomization imbalance at baseline, in Table
B.1. Approximately 6% of control group observations are missing and a very small number of treatment group observations
are missing (people who completed the survey but did not respond to a specific question). All covariates are standardized and
missing treatment data are imputed to the mean, or zero. Missing control group data are imputed to the mean plus 0.05, 0.10,
0.15, 0.20, or 0.25 SD of the variable, thus gradually increasing the values of the covariates in the control group. Columns (1)
to (6) report summary statistics (mean, SD, and number of observations) for the imputed treatment and control group values.
Columns (7) and (8) recalculate treatment-control mean differences using an ordinary least squares regression of the covariate
on assignment to treatment and district (randomization strata) fixed effects. The standard error in Column (8) is robust and
clustered by group.
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Table B.5: Robustness to alternate specifications
Alternate specification
Outcome variable Main No controls, Plus Plus human/ Randomization
specification district FE demographics physical capital inference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Index of NRM/Presidential support -0.041 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.041
[.052] [.054] [.054] [.053] [.054]
Index of opposition support 0.115 0.121 0.111 0.110 0.115
[.053]** [.053]** [.053]** [.053]** [.052]**
Index of general election political action 0.059 0.093 0.075 0.075 0.059
[.053] [.056]* [.054] [.053] [.053]
District (randomization block) FE Y Y Y Y Y
Demographics controls Y N Y Y Y
Human/physical capital controls Y N N Y Y
Group and political controls Y N N N Y
Group level of analysis N N N N Y
Observations 1858 1858 1858 1858 1858
Notes: The table displays four alternate specifications to test the robustness of our results. Column (1) displays our main
specification. Column (2) displays the results of a regression of the outcome measure on treatment and randomization block
(district) fixed effects without any controls. Column (3) adds in demographic controls while column (4) adds in both demographic
controls and human and physical capital controls. Column (5) is the same as our main specification but calculates effects at the
group-level The overall summary indexes are the standardized mean of its composite outcomes, standardized. Heterosketastic
robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.10
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Table B.6: Robustness to alternate attrition scenarios
Impute missing dependent variable with mean =
+(-)
“Worst case”
Main X SD for missing control (treatment) respondents Manski
Outcome variable (z-score) specification 0.025 SD 0.05 SD 0.10 SD 0.25 SD bound
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Upper bound
NRM/Presidential support -0.041 -0.020 -0.013 0.002 0.047 0.508
[.052] [.046] [.046] [.046] [.046] [.064]***
Opposition support 0.115 0.094 0.101 0.116 0.161 0.671
[.053]** [.045]** [.045]** [.045]** [.046]*** [.071]***
General political action 0.059 0.080 0.087 0.102 0.147 0.804
[.053] [.047]* [.047]* [.047]** [.047]*** [.078]***
Panel B: Lower bound
NRM/Presidential support -0.041 -0.035 -0.043 -0.058 -0.103 -0.529
[.052] [.046] [.046] [.046] [.046]** [.061]***
Opposition support 0.115 0.079 0.071 0.057 0.012 -0.601
[.053]** [.045]* [.046] [.046] [.046] [.081]***
General political action 0.059 0.065 0.057 0.042 -0.003 -0.682
[.053] [.047] [.047] [.047] [.047] [.075]***
Observations 1858 2025 2025 2025 2025 2025
Notes: The table reports robustness to alternative attrition scenarios. We impute missing observations for the dependent
variables. In columns 2 – 5, we impute missing dependent variables for the treatment group as the found treatment mean
minus a multiple of the standard deviation of the treatment distribution. Similarly, we impute missing dependent variables for
the control group as the found control mean plus a multiple of the standard deviation of the control distribution. In column 6
we apply Manski bounds, imputing the minimum value for unfound treated members and the maximum for unfound controls.
Each regression controls for baseline covariates and district fixed effects. The overall summary indexes are the standardized
mean of its composite outcomes, standardized. Heterosketastic robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.10
relatively low values to missing observations in the treatment group (treatment group mean
minus 0.025, 0.05, 0.10 or 0.50 SD of the found treatment distribution). The procedure
is reversed to calculate upper bounds (Panel B): we impute relatively low (high) values to
missing observations in the control (treatment) group. We also compute the lowest (and
highest) bound (column 6) following Manski 1990, by imputing the maximum (minimum)
value for unfound control members and the minimum (maximum) for unfound treated.
What this table shows is that the impacts of treatment on opposition support would
be spurious if the unfound members of the control group are more likely to be government
supporters than found members of the control group.
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Table B.7: Robustness to attrition weights
Alternate specification
Outcome variable Main Using
specification attrition weights
(1) (2)
Index of NRM/Presidential support -0.041 -0.031
[0.052] [0.053]
Index of opposition support 0.115 0.115
[0.053]** [0.054]**
Index of general election political action 0.059 0.053
[0.053] [0.054]
Observations 1858 1858
Notes: The table displays our main specification and a version where we reweight for attrition. The overall summary indexes
are the standardized mean of its composite outcomes, standardized. Heterosketastic robust standard errors are reported in
brackets.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.10
We have no theoretical reason to believe that attrition is correlated with government
support, but obviously this is unobserved. As seen in Appendix B.2, at baseline the unfound
tended to be younger, poorer, less literate farmers from larger communities. Our intent-to-
treat estimates control for these observable correlates of attrition, reducing the risk of bias.
Table B.7 also compares our main specification with one where we use inverse propensity
score weights for the propensity to go unfound based on all covariates, using the leave-one-out
method to estimate weights for each individual in the sample. The results are very similar
to our main specification, suggesting that attrition is not driving our results.
B.5 Treatment effects by age
In table B.8, we analyze treatment effects by age to see if the effect is driven by first-time
voters. At baseline we could not collect data on whether individuals previously voted and
who they voted for, because of restrictions from the government partner and research funder
(the World Bank). We do, however, have their age at baseline, which allows us to separate
the sample by those who were old enough to vote in the previous election versus those who
were not.
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Table B.8: Impacts by age
DV: Opposition support
Effect for
those 20 or
under in
2008
Effect for
those over
20 in 2008
Entire
sample
(1) (2) (3)
Assigned to treatment 0.066 0.146 0.139
[0.088] [0.064]** [0.063]**
Age 20 or under -0.075
[0.072]
Assigned x age 20 or under -0.106
[0.107]
Observations 371 1,487 1858
Notes: The table reports treatment effects on opposition by age as a proxy for
first time voting. In column 1, we limit the sample to individuals aged 20 or under
(or those who were not eligible to vote in the previous election). In column 2, we
limit the sample to individuals above the age of 20 (or those eligible to vote in the
previous election). In column 3, we use the entire sample and include a dummy
for being below 20 and an interaction between treatment and the dummy.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗p < 0.10
The figure shows that potential first time voters (individuals who were under 18 in
2005/20 or under in 2008) see no rise in opposition support. The effects are concentrated
among those who were eligible to vote in the previous election.
The lack of impact on young people offers some evidence that the effect we observe is
more about preferences. The impacts are coming from individuals who have more experience
voting These are not novices with an underdeveloped set of values. They are also more likely
to know the consequences of voting. However, this is speculative so we take this result with
caution.
B.6 Heterogeneity by fair and random selection
In Table B.9, we display treatment effects by individual’s perceptions of the selection pro-
cess. Among those who thought program selection was fair, opposition support rose by 0.13
standard deviations, compared to 0.121 standard deviations among those who perceived
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Table B.9: Heterogeneity by fair and random
DV: Opposition support
Thought selection was Thought selection was
fair not fair random not random
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Assigned to treatment 0.138 0.123 0.157 0.123
[0.067]** [0.113] [0.143] [0.058]**
Observations 1,160 696 234 1,624
R-squared 0.092 0.136 0.292 0.085
Notes: This table displays ITT results by individual’s perceptions of selections. In
columns 1 and 2 we show the treatment effect on individuals who thought selection
was fair or not. In columns 3 and 4, we limit the sample to individuals who thought
selection was random/not random.
selection as unfair. Among those who thought program selection was random, opposition
support rose 0.169 standard deviations, compared to 0.123 standard deviations among those
who perceived selection as non-random
B.7 Mediation analysis
In Table B.10 we conduct the mediation analysis described in Keele et al. (2015). In columns
1 and 2, we display treatment effects on all mediators displayed in section 4.2. In columns
3 and 4, we regress opposition support on treatment and each mediator, and display the
coefficient and standard error from each mediator. In columns 5 and 6, we regress opposition
support on treatment. In column 7, we display the percent of the effect on opposition support
mediated by each of variable listed. This is calculated by multiplying the coefficients in
column 1 by the coefficients in column 3, divided by the coefficients of column 5. We see
that our income index mediates a quarter of the total effect on opposition support, which is
large compared to other mediation analyses. The second largest factor is migration, which
mediates only 10 percent of the effect we see. All other mediators explain only 5% of the
effect we see on opposition support.
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Table B.10: Mediation analysis
Y: Opposition support; T: Treatment; M: Mediator
Reg. of M on T Reg. of Y on T and M Reg. of Y on T
Coeff. on T Coeff. on M Coeff. on T Percent
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. mediated
Mediator M (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Income, z-score 0.24 [.053]*** 0.11 [.031]*** 0.11 [.054]** 0.24
Index of 2011 election intimidation, z-score 0.03 [.051] 0.12 [.032]*** 0.11 [.054]** 0.03
Existence of a patron, z-score 0.14 [.051]*** -0.02 [.025] 0.11 [.054]** 0.02
Kin relations, z-score 0.05 [.048] -0.05 [.026]* 0.11 [.054]** 0.02
Community participation, z-score 0.01 [.053] -0.01 [.026] 0.11 [.054]** 0.00
Public goods contributions, z-score 0.02 [.050] -0.02 [.029] 0.11 [.054]** 0.00
Antisocial behaviors, z-score 0.01 [.050] 0.10 [.033]*** 0.11 [.054]** 0.01
Protest attitudes and participation, z-score -0.02 [.045] 0.34 [.034]*** 0.11 [.054]** 0.06
Migrated -0.04 [.036] 0.15 [.081]* 0.11 [.054]** 0.05
Group cooperation, z-score -0.21 [.133] -0.02 [.012]** 0.11 [.054]** 0.05
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) represent regressions of each mediator on treatment. Columns (3) and (4) display regressions of
opposition support on treatment and the mediator, Columns (5) and (6) display regressions of opposition support on treatment.
Column (7) displays the percent of the effect of opposition support mediated by the variables listed. This is calculated as the
coefficient in (1) times the coefficient in (2) divided by the coefficient of (3). See Keele et al. (2015) for more details. Standard
errors are heteroskedastic-robust and clustered by group.We calculate the ITT via a weighted least squares regression of the
dependent variable on a program assignment indicator, 13 district (randomization stratum) fixed effects, and a vector of control
variables that includes all of the baseline covariates reported in Appendix B.1.
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Table B.11: Program impacts on other outcomes
Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control ITT, with controls
Dependent variable in 2012 Mean Mean SD N
Elections were free and fair (0-3) 2.125 -0.051 [.045] 1817
Thinks it is likely that powerful people can find out how they voted 1.570 0.024 [.054] 1776
Thinks tax officials are corrupt (0-3) 1.547 -0.019 [.043] 1572
The tax department always has the right to make people pay taxes 2.439 -0.037 [.048] 1782
Enumerator sent by the government 0.408 0.005 [.024] 1755
Enumerator sent by the International org 0.324 0.017 [.023] 1755
Enumerator sent by others 0.268 -0.022 [.022] 1755
Knows the name of LC3 and LC5 (0-1) 0.734 0.016 [.022] 2022
‘Notes: This table displays ITT impacts on outcomes not displayed in the main tables. We regress each outcome
on treatment assignment, baseline covariates and block (district) fixed effects. We weight observations by the
inverse of the probability of selection into the endline survey.
B.8 Other outcomes
Table B.11 displays ITT effects on minor outcomes we collected that did not make it into
the main paper.
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